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This Article reveals how five states with presumptive (binding) sentencing
guidelines have implemented the right announced in Blakely v. Washington
to a jury finding of aggravating facts allowing upward departures from the
presumptive range. Using data provided by the sentencing commissions and
courts in Kansas, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, and Washington, as well
as information from more than 2,200 docket sheets, the study discloses how
upward departures are used in plea bargaining, sometimes undercutting policy
goals; how often aggravating facts are tried and by whom; common types of
aggravating facts; and the remarkably different, sometimes controversial
interpretations of Blakely and Alleyne v. United States that frame each
state’s practice. This new information is essential for any evaluation of
presumptive–sentencing guidelines systems or the appropriate scope of the
doctrine established in Apprendi v. New Jersey.
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INTRODUCTION
We could be entering a renaissance for presumptive sentencing guidelines.
The American Law Institute recently approved the new Model Penal Code:
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Sentencing (“MPCS”) with presumptive sentencing guidelines at its heart. 1
Alabama adopted presumptive sentencing guidelines for property offenses in
2013, 2 and Nevada is considering whether they may help to reduce incarceration
rates and racial disparities. 3 Some sentencing scholars continue to praise them
as a state’s best hope for achieving sentencing goals. 4
This Article reports new empirical information about one important aspect
of states’ experiences with presumptive sentencing guidelines: how they have
implemented the right announced in Blakely v. Washington 5 to a jury finding
beyond a reasonable doubt of any aggravating fact allowing an upward
departure from the presumptive-sentence range. 6 Using data provided by the
sentencing commissions and courts in Kansas, Minnesota, North Carolina,
Oregon, and Washington, this Article reveals how upward departures are used
in plea bargaining; how often aggravating facts are tried and by whom; common
types of aggravating facts; and the remarkably different, sometimes
controversial interpretations of Blakely that frame each state’s practice.
These new findings will inform ongoing debates about the appropriate
scope of the Apprendi v. New Jersey 7 line of cases and the merits of presumptive
sentencing guidelines. Sentencing scholars tend to have strong views on these
issues. Some may resent Blakely as a procedural tax, in their view perversely
burdening only the best sentencing systems, while leaving seriously flawed
1. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G § 1.02(2) cmt. j (AM. L. INST., forthcoming 2021)
(on file with author) (“Presumptive guidelines, if they are the product of reasoned consideration by
the commission, go a substantial way toward establishing uniformity of analysis as envisioned in the
Code.”).
2. See ALA. SENTENCING COMM’N, PRESUMPTIVE AND VOLUNTARY SENTENCING
STANDARDS: MANUAL 15–16 (2016), http://sentencingcommission.alacourt.gov/media/1065/2016presumptive-manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/SA8Q-HAZC]; see also Griffin Edwards, Stephen Rushin
& Joseph Colquitt, The Effects of Voluntary and Presumptive Sentencing Guidelines, 98 TEX. L. REV. 1, 24
(2019).
3. See, e.g., NEV. SENT’G COMM’N, FINAL REPORT 2, 6 (2019) (listing the Nevada Sentencing
Commission’s duties, including to “[e]valuate whether sentencing guidelines recommended pursuant
to subsection 8 should be mandatory”).
4. See, e.g., RICHARD S. FRASE, JUST SENTENCING: PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR A
WORKABLE SYSTEM 44–45, 203–04 (2013) [hereinafter FRASE, JUST SENTENCING] (discussing the
advantages of presumptive sentencing guidelines such as decreased risk of sentencing disparity between
defendants and lowered probability of defendants receiving a level of punishment disproportionate to
their culpability); MICHAEL O’HEAR, THE FAILED PROMISE OF SENTENCING REFORM 5 (2017)
(discussing the link between presumptive sentencing guidelines and reduced growth in incarceration
rates).
5. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
6. Id. at 303–05. In Washington, departures are called “exceptional sentences.” WASH. STATE
CASELOAD FORECAST COUNCIL, 2018 WASHINGTON STATE ADULT SENTENCING MANUAL 64
(2018) [hereinafter WASH. 2018 MANUAL]. In North Carolina, the term is “aggravated sentence.” See,
e.g., State v. Hurt, 361 N.C. 325, 326, 643 S.E.2d 915, 916 (2007). In Minnesota, it is “aggravated
departure.” See, e.g., State v. Barker, 705 N.W.2d 768, 776 (Minn. 2005). I will use “upward departure”
to refer to all of these higher-than-presumptive-range sentences.
7. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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systems untouched. 8 Others may admire Blakely as an essential safeguard
against the erosion of procedural protections in the Bill of Rights. 9 This Article
is full of new ammunition for both sides in such debates, including two novel
analyses—one testing the claim that presumptive sentencing guidelines
relinquish less sentencing power to the prosecutor than other fact-based
sentencing enhancements and the other cataloguing the potential procedural
advantages states enjoy by treating aggravating facts as something less than full
offense elements.
One finding reported here that may encourage those interested in
presumptive sentencing guidelines involves a concern that led some
presumptive-guidelines states to shift to advisory guidelines after Blakely was
decided fifteen years ago: the prospect of costly and cumbersome bifurcated
jury trials for aggravating factors. 10 This specter may well have deterred new
adoption of presumptive sentencing guidelines and may continue to haunt
adoption efforts today. But as Part III reports, aggravated factors are rarely
tried for predictable as well as surprising reasons. More concerning for fans of
presumptive sentencing guidelines is the uncertain future of some of the
assumptions that have allowed these five states to limit their Blakely burden.
The Supreme Court has continued to expand its rule from Apprendi, which
requires that certain aggravating facts a legislature intends the judge to find at
sentencing instead carry a right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt as
determined by a jury. 11 These expansions may threaten narrow interpretations
of Blakely by state courts, including holdings that exempt some upward
departures from jury consideration or that decline to treat aggravating facts as
elements for purposes of notice, waiver, double jeopardy, or due process. 12
Another important contribution is this Article’s original analysis of how
parties use upward-departure sentences in plea bargaining. Bargaining
inevitably circumvents any effort to structure sentencing discretion. Comparing
the use of upward-departure sentences with other fact-based, range-raising
devices such as mandatory minimum sentences, I find similar patterns as well
as important differences.

8. Kevin R. Reitz, The New Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and Constitutional Law at Cross-Purposes,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1101, 1106 (2005) (examining the concerns of Professor Richard Frase that
Blakely “tends to attack the most desirable systems while giving a constitutional free pass to many of
the worst”); Blakely, 542 U.S. at 314, 318 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (objecting that the Blakely rule will
“either trim or eliminate altogether their sentencing guidelines schemes and, with them, 20 years of
sentencing reform” and that it imposes a “substantial constitutional tax”).
9. E.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005) (recognizing that the Blakely rule
advances “the interest in fairness and reliability protected by the right to a jury trial—a common-law
right that defendants enjoyed for centuries and that is now enshrined in the Sixth Amendment”).
10. See infra note 18.
11. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; see, e.g., State v. Gould, 23 P.3d 801, 814 (Kan. 2001).
12. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 58–65, 78–79, 179–82, 195, 217–25.
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Following an introduction to presumptive sentencing guidelines, the
Blakely rule, and a short explanation of the data on which this study is based,
Part II addresses the volume of upward-departure sentences in the five
presumptive-guidelines states, as well as legal and policy choices that help
define that volume. Part III examines how upward-departure sentences are used
in plea bargaining, including examples of how parties manipulate these upward
departures to reach results inconsistent with sentencing policy, and barriers to
judicial control. Part IV reports detailed information about the adjudication of
aggravating factors in contested cases. Specifically, it examines: (1) the low
percentage of cases in which formal notice is docketed in advance of conviction,
(2) the use of bifurcated jury proceedings, (3) the rate of stipulation to
aggravated facts after conviction at trial, and (4) the many ways that state
procedure for adjudicating these factors differs from the Supreme Court’s
characterization of aggravating facts as elements of the offense.
I. SUMMARY OF PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCING GUIDELINES, THE BLAKELY
RULE, AND STUDY DATA
A.

Presumptive Sentencing Guidelines in the States

Sentencing guidelines regulate a judge’s sentencing discretion. Under a
presumptive-guidelines system, the entire statutory range of punishment for a
given offense is not available to the judge upon conviction. 13 Instead,
presumptive sentencing guidelines designate a narrower range as the
presumptive sentence, appropriate for a typical violation. Sentence options
above or below the presumptive range are available only after a finding of one
or more aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Without these requisite
findings, sentences outside of the presumptive range can be overturned on
appeal; hence, some alternatively label presumptive sentencing guidelines as
“binding” 14 or “mandatory” guidelines. 15
When initially adopted in the 1980s and 1990s, presumptive-guidelines
systems allowed judges to determine, by a preponderance of proof, aggravating

13. E.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, 6
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.3(e) (4th ed. 2015), Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2020).
14. Richard S. Frase, Forty Years of American Sentencing Guidelines: What Have We Learned?, 48
CRIME & JUST. 79, 99 (2019) [hereinafter Frase, Forty Years] (terming these presumptive-guidelines
systems “binding systems with active appellate review”).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). Appellate oversight varies in
degree. See Richard S. Frase, Varying Binding Effects of Guidelines -- the Mandatory-to-Advisory
Continuum, UNIV. MINN.: SENT’G GUIDELINES RES. CTR. (Mar. 25, 2015), https://sentencing.umn
.edu/content/varying-binding-effects-guidelines-mandatory-advisory-continuum [https://perma.cc/
W3NY-MPFK].
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facts required for sentencing above the presumptive range at sentencing. 16 But
in 2004, the Supreme Court in Blakely applied Apprendi to hold that when
judicial adherence to a presumptive punishment range is enforceable through
appeal, any fact (other than prior conviction) required to exceed that range must
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury or admitted by the defendant. 17
Although Kansas anticipated Blakely’s rule as an inevitable consequence of the
Court’s decision in Apprendi, Blakely surprised almost everyone else. Suddenly
the Constitution required jury trials for facts that for years had been adjudicated
less formally at sentencing. The prospect of complying with Blakely and proving
aggravating facts beyond a reasonable doubt to juries prompted some states to
abandon appellate enforcement of presumptive ranges, rendering their
presumptive sentencing guidelines “advisory.” 18
The five states examined in this Article kept their presumptive sentencing
guidelines, despite Blakely. Each state determines the presumptive-sentencing
range for a defendant by cross referencing the defendant’s criminal history with
the severity level for the crime of conviction. 19 Often, presumptive ranges
specify a type of sentence (such as probation, jail, or prison) as well as the
presumptive duration of sentence for each case. 20 A sentence that is more severe
than a sentence within the presumptive range is an upward departure—either a
more punitive type of sentence—(an “upward dispositional departure”), or a
16. See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, Other States, and the Federal
Courts: A Twenty-Year Retrospective, 12 FED. SENT’G REP. 69, 70–72 (1999); Don Stemen & Daniel F.
Wilhelm, Finding the Jury: State Legislative Responses to Blakely v. Washington, 18 FED. SENT’G REP. 7,
7 (2005).
17. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303–05 (2004).
18. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G § 10.07 reporters’ note k (AM. L. INST., forthcoming
2021) (on file with author); Stemen & Wilhelm, supra note 16, at 9–10 (explaining that in Tennessee,
“[t]he Governor’s Task Force on the Use of Enhancement Factors in Criminal Sentencing . . . proposed
the switch to a voluntary system . . . [and] noted that jury fact-finding could ‘increase service time of
jurors, increase jury trial time on the court docket, impose increased burdens on public defenders and
district attorneys and otherwise increase the costs of the administration of justice’” (quoting
GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE ON THE USE OF ENHANCEMENT FACTORS IN CRIM. SENT’G, REPORT
OF THE GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE ON THE USE OF ENHANCEMENT FACTORS IN CRIMINAL
SENTENCING 3 (2005))); see also Edwards et al., supra note 2, at 17 (collecting judicial and academic
views that states’ “attempts to maintain sentencing guidelines while complying with Blakely would
prove unnecessarily burdensome and taxing to implement”).
19. These states use a grid with criminal history on one axis and severity level for the offense of
conviction on the other. Kelly Lyn Mitchell, State Sentencing Guidelines: A Garden Full of Variety, FED.
PROB., Sept. 2017, at 28, 28–29. Some states have separate grids for sex or drug offenses. For an
excellent collection of information and law for every state using sentencing guidelines, see Sentencing
Guidelines Resource Center, ROBINA INST. CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST., https://sentencing.umn.edu/
[https://perma.cc/W3RU-YDJR].
20. None set presumptive ranges for fines or other economic sanctions, although the MPCS
recommends that these be included. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G § 9.04(3)(b) (AM. L. INST.,
forthcoming 2021) (on file with author). If they were included, upward departures above the
presumptive ranges for financial sanctions would trigger Apprendi’s rule as affirmed by Blakely. See S.
Union Co. v. United States, 567 U.S. 343, 348–51, 359–61 (2012).
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longer term (an “upward durational departure”). 21 In each state, proof of a single
aggravating fact gives the judge the option of exceeding the presumptive
range. 22
B.

Why Study the Adjudication of Aggravating Facts?

Proponents of presumptive sentencing guidelines assert that concerns
about the burdens of proving aggravating facts beyond a reasonable doubt to a
jury are “unfounded” 23 and that the cost of adjudicating these facts is “small and
manageable.” 24 Yet, other than annual reports from these states showing that
only a very small percentage of felony sentences involve upward departures, no
research has attempted to examine this particular claim. For example, there has
been no effort to determine how aggravating facts are used in bargaining, how
many defendants admit aggravating facts after conviction, how many trials are
bifurcated, or how often defendants opt for a bench trial on the aggravating fact

21. The use of dispositional departures varies by state. See infra text accompanying notes 56–57.
22. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-6815 to -6818 (Westlaw through laws enacted during the 2021
Reg. Sess. of the Kan. Leg. effective on Apr. 1, 2021); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16 (LEXIS
through Sess. Laws 2021-6 of the 2021 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 136.785 (Westlaw through laws enacted in the 2020 Reg. Sess. of the 80th Legis. Assemb.); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.94A.535, 9.94A.537 (LEXIS through chapter 9 of the 2021 Reg. Sess.); State
v. Vance, 765 N.W.2d 390, 394 (Minn. 2009).
This is one of many features that makes these systems simpler than the excessively complex U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines. Instead of one presumptive range per offense varying only with criminal
history, as in these states’ presumptive-guidelines systems, the federal guidelines provide dozens of
possible ranges for a given offense for a given defendant. Which one applies depends on a score derived
by adding and subtracting points for a very long list of often contestable aggravating and mitigating
facts, including “relevant conduct.” Departure requirements are layered on top of all that. See, e.g.,
United States v. Perez-Silvan, 861 F.3d 935, 944 (9th Cir. 2017) (Owens, J., concurring) (urging the
U.S. Sentencing Commission to “simplify the Guidelines to avoid the frequent sentencing adventures
more complicated than reconstructing the Staff of Ra in the Map Room to locate the Well of the
Souls”); Richard B. Ruback & Jonathan Wroblewski, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Psychological and
Policy Reasons for Simplification, 7 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 739, 749–53 (2001) (discussing the
complexity and perceived flaws in the structure of the federal guidelines); Kate Stith, Principles,
Pragmatism, and Politics: The Evolution of Washington State’s Sentencing Guidelines, 76 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 105, 105–07 (2013) (explaining that Washington’s presumptive sentencing guidelines are less
complex than the federal guidelines).
In some states, an additional showing is required for departure sentences that exceed twice the
presumptive range. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6818(b)–(c) (Westlaw); State v. Jackson, 749 N.W.2d 353,
359 (Minn. 2008); Neal v. State, 658 N.W.2d 536, 544 (Minn. 2003); State v. Spain, 590 N.W.2d 85,
89 (Minn. 1999); OR. ADMIN. R. 213-008-0003(2), 213-008-0005(3) (Westlaw through rules filed
through Mar. 23, 2021). In North Carolina, the judge imposes an aggravated minimum sentence, and
the maximum becomes 120% of that plus a period of supervised release. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A1340.17 (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2021-6 of the 2021 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.).
23. See, e.g., FRASE, JUST SENTENCING, supra note 4, at 47 (calling concerns about “problems in
complying with the requirements of Blakely” unfounded).
24. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G § 10.07 reporters’ note a (AM. L. INST., forthcoming
2021) (on file with author).
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rather than a jury trial. Nor has there been any effort to determine the reasons
why some states have higher upward-departure rates than others.
In addition to addressing these issues, this Article also sheds new light on
the purported advantages of relying upon presumptive sentencing guidelines
over other methods of calibrating sentences using factual findings beyond those
inherent in a conviction. Probably the most traditional alternative method has
been for the legislature to enact a separate, aggravated version of a core offense,
tacking on an aggravating fact to create a greater offense, such as robbery and
armed robbery. Such “nested” or “graded” offenses exist in every type of
sentencing system, indeterminate and determinate, guidelines or no guidelines.
So do mandatory minimum sentences and other sentence enhancements, which
became popular in the second half of the twentieth century. 25 Mandatory
minimum statutes raise the floor of the available sentence range for an offense
whenever a designated fact is determined; sentence-enhancement statutes
either mandate or permit a more severe sentence once the designated fact is
determined. 26
The Court’s Apprendi doctrine does not distinguish between these
alternative ways of keying punishment ranges to factfinding. Apprendi
guarantees to the defendant the right to a unanimous jury determination,
beyond a reasonable doubt, of any fact (other than the fact of a previous
conviction) that raises the minimum or maximum penalty beyond what was
authorized by the conviction alone. 27 In the Court’s view, that range-raising fact
is an element, like any other element. 28 Because they all should trigger the same
25. See generally Erik Luna, Mandatory Minimums, in 4 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PUNISHMENT, INCARCERATION, AND RELEASE 117, 117–24 (Erik Luna ed., 2017),
https://law.asu.edu/sites/default/files/pdf/academy_for_justice/7_Criminal_Justice_Reform_Vol_4_
Mandatory-Minimums.pdf [https://perma.cc/VTK8-5Q84]; DALE PARENT, TERENCE DUNWORTH,
DOUGLAS MCDONALD & WILLIAM RHODES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., KEY LEGISLATIVE ISSUES IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: MANDATORY SENTENCING 1 (1997), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/161839.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5FRL-MY33]; see also infra note 40 and accompanying text.
26. Luna, supra note 25, at 117, 119; PARENT ET AL., supra note 25, at 1.
27. See Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 111–12 (2013).
28. See, e.g., id. (“Apprendi concluded that any ‘facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties
to which a criminal defendant is exposed’ are elements of the crime . . . . (‘[F]acts that expose a
defendant to a punishment greater than that otherwise legally prescribed were by definition “elements”
of a separate legal offense.’)” (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000))); Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (stating the “aggravating factors” that render a defendant eligible
for capital punishment in Arizona “operate as ‘the functional equivalent of an element of a greater
offense’” (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 n.19 (2000))); see also Burrage v. United
States, 571 U.S. 204, 210 (2014) (“Because the ‘death results’ enhancement increased the minimum and
maximum sentences to which Burrage was exposed, it is an element that must be submitted to the jury
and found beyond a reasonable doubt . . . . Thus, the crime charged in count 2 of Burrage’s superseding
indictment has two principal elements: (i) knowing or intentional distribution of heroin, § 841(a)(1),
and (ii) death caused by (‘resulting from’) the use of that drug, § 841(b)(1)(C).” (first quoting Alleyne,
570 U.S. at 115–16; and then quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000))); United
States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2395 (2019) (Alito, J., dissenting) (distinguishing the situation in
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constitutional protections, any of the alternative range-raising devices should
impose similar procedural costs. Yet advocates of presumptive sentencing
guidelines have argued that presumptive guidelines are a superior option
because they enforce judicial adherence to fact-based calibration while
relinquishing less sentencing power to the prosecutor. 29 As noted earlier, this
Article is the first to address the merits of this claim in states with presumptive
sentencing guidelines. It also reveals the potential procedural advantages these
states enjoy by withholding protections for the adjudication of aggravating facts
that are normally afforded other elements of the offense.
Lastly, information about how judges and prosecutors use upward
departures in these presumptive-guidelines states can inform ongoing research
evaluating the impact of presumptive sentencing guidelines. Quantitative
research about presumptive sentencing guidelines has focused, understandably,
on whether they exacerbate or mitigate incarceration growth and racial
inequities, compared to other sentencing systems. This is important and
promising research, but no consensus on these points has emerged. 30 Knowing
United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019), from the Court’s Apprendi line of cases, where the
Court “rejected what it saw as attempts to place the label ‘sentencing enhancement’ on what, in its
view, were essentially elements of charged offenses”).
29. See infra notes 149–68 and accompanying text.
30. On impacting incarceration rates, see, for example, MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G app. B at
916 (AM. L. INST., forthcoming 2021) (on file with author); NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, THE GROWTH
OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 76–78
(Jeremy Travis, Bruce Western & Steve Redburn eds., 2014) [hereinafter NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL,
THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION]; Richard S. Frase, Can Sentencing Guidelines Commissions Help
States Substantially Reduce Mass Incarceration?, 104 MINN. L. REV. 2781, 2796–97 (2020) (noting that
data comparing systems is “inconclusive” on whether presumptive sentencing guidelines are better at
reducing incarceration); John F. Pfaff, The Continued Vitality of Structured Sentencing Following Blakely:
The Effectiveness of Voluntary Guidelines, 54 UCLA L. REV. 235, 261–65 (2006) (providing statistics and
noting that presumptive sentencing guidelines appear to be more effective than voluntary guidelines
at reducing the variation in sentences between defendants); Kevin R. Reitz, Prison-Release Reform and
American Decarceration, 104 MINN. L. REV. 2741, 2745, 2769–79 (2020).
On racial disparities, see Edwards et al., supra note 2, at 19–20 nn.107–13, 32 (collecting
research that was inconclusive regarding whether making federal guidelines advisory increased
racial disparity and also finding that “the introduction of sentencing guidelines in Alabama
contributed to reductions in sentence length, reductions in racial disparities in sentences for similar
offenses, and reductions in interjudge disparities in sentence lengths”); RICHARD S. FRASE & JULIAN
V. ROBERTS, PAYING FOR THE PAST: THE CASE AGAINST PRIOR RECORD SENTENCE
ENHANCEMENTS 128–48 (2019); WASH. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMM’N, REVIEW OF THE
SENTENCING REFORM ACT 8–9 (2019) [hereinafter WASH. COMM’N, 2019 REVIEW],
https://sentencing.umn.edu/sites/sentencing.umn.edu/files/washington_review_of_the_sentencing_re
form_act_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/36N9-EVCG] (“[S]ystems where judges have the greatest
discretion, where they are not required to abide by the guidelines, do not have an increase in racial
disparity over those that are more restrictive.”); MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G § 1.02(2) cmt. k,
reporters’ note k (AM. L. INST., forthcoming 2021) (on file with author) (collecting research and
claiming it “suggests that presumptive sentencing guidelines systems and determinate (non-paroling)
systems have produced lower levels of racial and ethnic disparities compared with advisory guidelines
systems, nonguidelines systems, and indeterminate systems”).
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more about how these presumptive sentencing guidelines are applied by the
lawyers and judges who use them can help inform why presumptive sentencing
guidelines may or may not impact incarceration rates, racial disparities, rates of
recidivism and crime, and perceived legitimacy. 31
C.

Summary of Data for Study

For this study, all five presumptive-guidelines states provided information
about adult felony cases where the sentence included an upward departure from
the presumptive range. 32 Detail varied considerably but included the type of
offense, year of conviction, sentence or commitment, type of sentence (for
example, probation or incarceration), and whether the conviction was by plea
or trial. Analysis of Oregon’s data was limited to the years 2016 and 2017
because departure data was not collected until 2015. The other states’ data
covered eight years of sentencing, 2010–2017.
Using case numbers in data sets from Kansas, Minnesota, and Oregon, my
research assistants and I were able to obtain and examine trial court registers or

Simple comparisons of the presumptive-guidelines states with other states are suggestive, but the
effects of supervision, revocation, good-time credit, and release practices and policies may dwarf the
effects of the type of guidelines system a state follows. See, e.g., Reitz, supra, at 2748 (discussing parole
release generally and stating, “The cumulative actions of parole boards can generate large swings in a
state’s prison population while hardly alerting anyone to the source of the change”). Another challenge
for these analyses is that even if it is possible to control for the constantly changing law and practice
within and between states, most studies examine sentencing information by crime of conviction alone,
masking the arrest, charging, and bargaining decisions that produce those sentences. See, e.g., Amy
Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1684–85 (2012) (“[M]easuring
disparity solely with reference to judicial decisionmaking ignores disparities inevitably created by
differing prosecutorial charging and plea-bargaining policies and strategies across cases and districts.”).
31. See, e.g., O’HEAR, supra note 4, at 5 (“[R]estricting judicial discretion in this way does not
necessarily lead to tougher sentences; it all depends on how exactly the restriction is designed and
implemented.”).
32. None of the data sets I obtained were or are publicly available online. Accordingly, I report
only aggregate statistics and do not provide complete citations for individual cases. The Kansas
Sentencing Commission provided data on adult felony sentences imposed for 2010–2017. The
Washington State Caseload Forecasting Council provided adult sentencing data from Washington for
the years 2010–2017. The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission provided data on adult
criminal cases with felony sentences that included an aggravated departure imposed for the years 2010–
2017. The Research and Evaluation Unit of the Minnesota Judicial Branch also provided, for the same
time period, data on adult felony cases ending in conviction with specified “Blakely” events. See infra
note 156 and accompanying text. The Oregon Criminal Justice Commission provided data on adult
sentences imposed in Oregon for the years 2016 and 2017. Felony historical data for North Carolina
cases—Statistical Report Data for the years 2010–2017—were provided by the North Carolina
Sentencing and Policy Advisory Commission (“NCSPAC”). My analysis of these data sets took place
between February and August of 2020. It included date limiting, consolidating multiple annual data
sets with different variables, consolidating multiple observations for a single case, removing duplicate
entries, and creating dozens of new variables for analysis. My analysis and any conclusions in this
Article may not be attributed to, and are not endorsed by, the NCSPAC or any of the other data
providers listed above.
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docket sheets for many of the upward-departure cases. 33 These docket sheets
often included information not available in the relevant state sentencing
commission’s data—such as whether the trial was bifurcated, whether the
defendant admitted the aggravating fact, or the reason for the upward
departure. 34
II. THE VOLUME OF UPWARD-DEPARTURE SENTENCES CARRYING A
RIGHT TO A JURY FINDING BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT
Before turning to the number of aggravated sentences subject to the
Blakely rule, consider what factors might determine that number. One factor is
the extent to which a state allows sentencing outside the presumptive sentencing
guidelines. The celebrated capacity of presumptive sentencing guidelines to
achieve sentences with greater consistency, legitimacy, and more effective fiscal
management 35 presupposes a sentencing system designed and amended as a
whole. But the gradual accretion of mandatory minimum sentences and
sentencing-enhancement provisions 36 removes an ever-increasing portion of

33. Information from the docket sheets in more than 2,200 cases was collected. From Minnesota,
I gathered information for the more than 400 cases from 2010 to 2017 that included an upwarddeparture sentence and an indication in data from either the Minnesota Judicial Branch or the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission that a bench or jury trial had been held. Using
Minnesota Judicial Branch data, I also coded the dockets of 332 cases (including all tried cases) in which
the data indicated that the prosecutor had sought an upward departure but one was not imposed.
Finally, I coded a nonrandom sample of 186 cases from among guilty plea cases with upward departures
in Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission data. From Kansas, I collected docket information
for all 135 cases including an upward durational departure sentence from 2010 to 2017. From Oregon, I
gathered docket information for 1,132 cases, consisting of all cases from 2016 to 2017 with both an
upward dispositional and upward durational departure, an upward durational departure only, or an
upward dispositional and downward durational departure, as well as a 13.2% random sample of the
1,087 downward dispositional / upward durational departure cases, and a 6.4% random sample of the
3,064 upward dispositional departure cases.
For Minnesota and Oregon, I downloaded trial court dockets from each state court’s website. In
Kansas, dockets from a few counties were publicly available online, and others I purchased.
34. For cases that had been appealed, this information was sometimes available in an appellate
opinion, which I located by searching for the appellate opinion on the public websites in Kansas,
Minnesota, and Oregon. In Kansas and Minnesota, many of the tried cases with upward durational
departures had been appealed, but often the appeal challenged the conviction alone and shed no
additional light on the adjudication of the fact underlying the upward departure.
35. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G § 1.02(2)(b) cmts. j, k, l, o (AM. L. INST.,
forthcoming 2021) (on file with author) (explaining the advantages of presumptive sentencing
guidelines in meeting these ends).
36. See, e.g., RACHEL ELISE BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF
MASS INCARCERATION 33–36 (2019) [hereinafter BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS] (discussing
the history and rise in popularity of mandatory minimum sentences); Russell M. Gold, Prosecutors and
Their Legislatures, Legislatures and Their Prosecutors, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PROSECUTORS AND
PROSECUTION (Ronald Wright, Kay Levine & Russel Gold eds., forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at
546, 555–62) (on file with author) (discussing the development and increasing prevalence of mandatory
minimums and sentence enhancements); Michael Tonry, Sentencing in America, 1975-2025, in 42 CRIME
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felony adjudication from sentencing guidelines regulation. The result is that
every presumptive-guidelines state has some set of cases to which the guidelines
do not apply. This not only undercuts the ability of presumptive sentencing
guidelines to meet policy goals, 37 but it also affects the amount and type of
upward departures. A state in which most offenses are sentenced under the
presumptive sentencing guidelines is likely to have more upward departures
than a state in which a legislature has opted for alternative ways to increase
punishment when designated circumstances are present.
Two other factors may affect the volume of aggravated sentences that carry
a right to a jury finding: the breadth of a state’s presumptive-sentencing ranges
and a state’s unique interpretations of the Court’s Apprendi doctrine. The
sections below examine how each of these three factors may have influenced the
magnitude of aggravated sentencing subject to the Blakely rule in the five states
examined in this Article.
A.

Bypassing the Presumptive Sentencing Guidelines

The MPCS advances a model sentencing scheme that abolishes mandatory
minimum sentences 38 and only rarely exempts offenses from guidelines
sentencing. 39 Legislators are supposed to set broad sentence ranges and then
keep their hands off, refraining from boosting minimum or maximum sentences
for specified scenarios beyond the ranges adopted by the state’s sentencing
commission. The five states using presumptive sentencing guidelines discussed
in this study fall short of this ideal, to differing degrees. In each, the reach of
the guidelines has contracted as legislators have expanded the number of
AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA, 1975-2025, at 141, 144–45 (Michael Tonry ed., 2013) (explaining the
proliferation of mandatory minimums).
37. A sentencing commission can slow this trend by warning legislators about such negative
effects, see Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 810–11 (2005), but that
requires that a state’s sentencing commission receive sustained funding for research, independence
from political pressure, and significant deference from those with the power to undercut its penalty or
policy choices, see id. at 781–87; see also MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G § 8.01 cmts. b–d (AM. L. INST.,
forthcoming 2021) (on file with author) (discussing required attributes of state sentencing
commissions); BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS, supra note 36, at 171–77 (discussing various issues
with existing state sentencing commissions and more advantageous approaches to avoid those problems
in both state sentencing commissions and criminal justice agencies at large); FRASE, JUST
SENTENCING, supra note 4, at 42–44 (describing the ideal structure and characteristics of a state
sentencing commission); Stemen & Wilhelm, supra note 16, at 9–10 (arguing that presumptivesentencing systems survived Blakely in states where legislatures fund strong state sentencing
commissions that were able to provide reports that could explain procedural changes required in
response).
38. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G §§ 1.02(2) cmt. i, 6.02 cmt. c (AM. L. INST., forthcoming
2021) (on file with author).
39. Id. § 9.09(2) (stating that offenses should be excluded from sentencing guidelines only if
“prosecutions are rarely initiated, if the offense definitions are so broad that presumptive sentences
cannot reasonably be fashioned, or for other sufficient reasons that inclusion in the guidelines would
be of marginal utility”).
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mandatory minimum and special-sentencing statutes that trump the application
of the guidelines. 40
Kansas dramatically illustrates this phenomenon. Many have pointed to
Kansas as proof that the number of upward departures subject to the Blakely
rule in a presumptive-guidelines system can be quite small and manageable. 41
Kansas Sentencing Commission reports suggest that no more than four percent
of total guidelines sentences—probation and incarceration combined—involve
any upward departure. 42 Yet a close look at sentencing in Kansas suggests that
40. In Washington, enhancements have grown over the years. WASH. COMM’N, 2019 REVIEW,
supra note 30, at 20 (noting the increase in the list of offenses to which firearm enhancements could be
applied, the creation of eleven other enhancements, and the complexity of these enhancements that
“are, at their core, mandatory minimums”); id. at app. E (displaying a three-page “Sentencing
Enhancement Reference Guide”); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.540 (LEXIS through
chapter 9 of the 2021 Reg. Sess.) (providing mandatory minimum terms for certain murders, assaults,
rapes, and escapes); James Drew, Is Giving Judges More Discretion in Sentencing the Right Reform?
Lawmakers To Decide, NEWS TRIB., https://www.thenewstribune.com/news/politics-government/
article234301847.html [https://perma.cc/8VZ2-FDFU] (Aug. 25, 2019, 9:46 AM) (“Hauge, chairman
of the Sentencing Guidelines Commission and a former Kitsap County Prosecuting Attorney, said
there have been several ‘good-faith’ efforts to make the law better, but ‘what we have created is a system
of almost impenetrable complexity that the Department of Corrections is charged with making sense
of.’”).
In North Carolina, drug trafficking crimes and violent habitual offenders are sentenced outside
the presumptive sentencing guidelines. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-95(h) (LEXIS through Sess. Laws
2021-6 of the 2021 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.) (covering drug trafficking crimes); id. § 14-7.12
(LEXIS) (covering violent habitual offenders). There are a number of other sentence-enhancement
provisions raising the presumptive-sentencing range based on a finding of fact, including possession of
a bulletproof vest, knowing the behavior violates a protective order, and use of a firearm. N.C. SENT’G
& POL’Y ADVISORY COMM’N, STRUCTURED SENTENCING TRAINING AND REFERENCE MANUAL
9, 26 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 N.C. STRUCTURED SENTENCING MANUAL] (listing offense class
enhancement facts).
In Minnesota, mandatory minimum provisions include terms for felony DWI, MINN. STAT.
§ 169A.276 (2020), and firearm enhancements, id. § 609.11. Other mandatory sentences are provided
for sex offender–registration violations, furnishing alcohol to minors, assaults against police officers,
any gang-related felony, and more. See MINN. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES RSCH. DEP’T,
MANDATORY SENTENCING LAWS INFORMATION BRIEF 4, 6 (2011); see also MINN. SENT’G
GUIDELINES COMM’N, MINNESOTA FELONY STATUTORY SENTENCING ENHANCEMENTS:
HIGHLIGHTS FROM 1987 TO 2017, at 1–6 (2017) (listing the development of different sentencing
enhancements over a thirty-year period).
41. See, e.g., WASH. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMM’N, REPORT OF THE SENTENCING
GUIDELINES COMMISSION: DISCRETION UNDER THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT AND THE
IMPACT OF BLAKELY V. WASHINGTON 10 (2005) [hereinafter WASH. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMM’N,
BLAKELY REPORT] (reporting that a survey of judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys in Kansas
“‘did not find anyone who believed that the post-Gould statutory changes have had any appreciable
effect on the operation of the Kansas sentencing process.’” (quoting Reitz, The New Sentencing
Conundrum, supra note 8, at 1109 n.101)); Stemen & Wilhelm, supra note 16, at 8; MODEL PENAL
CODE: SENT’G § 10.07 reporters’ note a (AM. L. INST., forthcoming 2021) (on file with author) (noting
that Kansas’s approach using jury factfinding does not burden their court system).
42. See, e.g., KAN. SENT’G COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2018: ANALYSIS OF SENTENCING
GUIDELINES IN KANSAS 64–66 (2019) [hereinafter KAN. 2018 ANNUAL REPORT], https://
www.sentencing.ks.gov/docs/default-source/annual-reports/fy2018annualreport.pdf?sfvrsn=5f8bfd3f
_6 [https://perma.cc/UH45-LFNG] (reporting 85 upward dispositional and 188 upward durational
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one contributor to this low number is the volume of cases that receive elevated
sentences under separate sentencing provisions and are not counted as upward
departures.
Kansas sentencing law diverts just under half of its prison sentences away
from its guidelines, meaning those elevated sentences are not reported as
upward departures from the guidelines. There are two reasons for this. First, as
in many other presumptive-guidelines states, the most serious crimes in
Kansas—murder, terrorism, and certain sex offenses—are sentenced under their
own sentencing statutes rather than the presumptive sentencing guidelines. 43
Analysis of data from 2010 to 2017 provided by the Kansas Sentencing
Commission shows that these “off-grid” cases accounted for about one percent
of prison sentences imposed during that period.
In addition to this one percent of prison sentences diverted from departure
analysis, a much larger set of felony sentences are not counted in the Kansas
Sentencing Commission’s reports as upward departures because they are
imposed under one of the four dozen special-sentencing rules that raise the
sentence range available to the judge. 44 For example, in 2018, an estimated
forty-five percent of prison sentences were not governed by the Kansas
guidelines’ departure provisions because of one or more of these special rules. 45

departure sentences, of 6,891 total guideline sentences, or 3.96%, which counts cases with both upward
dispositional and upward durational departures twice).
43. See KAN. SENT’G COMM’N, KANSAS SENTENCING GUIDELINES DESK REFERENCE
MANUAL 2018, at 14–16 (2018) [hereinafter KANSAS 2018 MANUAL] (explaining off-grid crimes).
44. KAN. SENT’G COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT: FY 2019, at xiv–xv (2020); see also Terri Savely,
25 Years of the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines: Where We Were, Where We Are, and What’s Next?, 86 J. KAN.
BAR ASS’N 22, 30 (2017) (“The once essentially straightforward grid process has become fractured by
constant legislative changes and the adoption of numerous special rules.”). All sentences imposed
because of a special rule are entirely excluded from the Kansas Sentencing Commission’s reported
upward-departure analysis. See, e.g., KAN. SENT’G COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2017,
at xiv–xv (2018).
45. KAN. 2018 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 42, at 80–81. For diverted sentences from 2014 to
2017, see id. at 81 (showing, of sentences to prison, 43.5% were sentences with special rules and thus
not considered upward departures). These figures exclude off-grid sentences as well as sentences that
run concurrently with or consecutively to a preguideline sentence. See id. at 80.
Nearly ninety percent of all special-rule cases are sentenced under a rule that allows or mandates
the imposition of an incarceration sentence despite a presumed sentence of nonincarceration. The three
most commonly applied special-sentence rules raise the presumed sentence from nonprison to prison.
One raises the presumed sentence for a “person” felony (a felony triggered by an act or threat of
physical violence against another person) to imprisonment if a judge finds it was committed with a
firearm, and the other two allow a sentence of imprisonment, even when the presumed sentence is
nonprison, if the offense was committed while incarcerated, under supervision, or on felony bond.
Other special rules tack on an additional term after the trier of fact finds a fact, such as possessing a
firearm in furtherance of a drug felony (adds six months’ imprisonment) or discharging a firearm while
committing a drug felony (adds eighteen months). These are essentially aggravated offenses, with the
fact included as part of the verdict, but are enacted as a sentencing provision. Still other special rules
are pure prior-conviction enhancements, or operate to permit consecutive sentencing, and thus do not

99 N.C. L. REV. 1241 (2021)

2021]

HANDLING AGGRAVATING FACTS AFTER BLAKELY

1255

This removal of nearly half of Kansas’s prison sentences from departure analysis
may explain, at least in part, why the percentage of all felony sentences
including an upward departure is lower in Kansas compared to the other four
states examined for this Article. See Table 1.
Table 1. Percentage of Adult Felony Sentences Including Upward Departure
(“up dep”) 46
State
KS
MN
NC
OR
WA

Years of
Sentencing Data
2010–2017
2010–2017
2010–2017
2016–2017
2010–2017

Total Adult
Felony
Sentences
91,840
127,530
235,551
53,441
191,863

UpwardDeparture
Sentences
799
5,620
8,033
4,946
3,942

Up Deps. as a %
of Adult Felony
Sentences
0.9
4.4
3.4
9.3
2.1

Shifting sentencing for certain cases away from the presumptive
sentencing guidelines to other range-raising approaches can not only reduce the
volume of upward departures, but can also change the mix of offenses that
receive upward departures. Some common upward-departure factors related to
victimization—such as unusually severe harm or loss, vulnerable victim,
multiple victims, or deliberate cruelty—are more likely to apply in crimes

trigger Blakely. See KANSAS 2018 MANUAL, supra note 43, at 48–57 (outlining special-sentencing rules
in Kansas).
I did not attempt to track the application of enhancements and other sentencing statutes in the
other states. Even if data are available, the number, type, applicability, and scope of enhancements vary
significantly, even within a single state from year to year. See, e.g., WASH. COMM’N, 2019 REVIEW,
supra note 30, at app. E (showing Washington’s Sentencing Enhancement Reference Guide).
46. Table includes figures for Kansas, North Carolina, and Washington from data provided by
each state’s sentencing commission. The number for total adult felony sentences for Minnesota is from
the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission’s Sentencing Practices published in 2018, MINN.
SENT’G GUIDELINES COMM’N, 2017 SENTENCING PRACTICES 36 tbl.5 (2018) [hereinafter MINN.
2017 SENTENCING PRACTICES], and the number of upward departures is from data that the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines Commission provided to me for this Article.
The total number of felonies sentenced for Oregon was estimated by multiplying the
conviction rates from 2016 to 2017 (83%), OR. CRIM. JUST. COMM’N, 2019 SAC GRANT
REPORT: FELONY CASE PROCESSING TRENDS IN OREGON 9 tbl.4.2.1 (2019) [hereinafter 2019 SAC
GRANT REPORT], by the total felony cases terminated from 2016 to 2017 (64,387), OR. JUD. DEP’T,
STATISTICAL REPORT RELATING TO THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF OREGON 1 tbl.2 (2017),
https://www.courts.oregon.gov/about/Documents/ojd_2016_and_2017_Terminated_Case_Trend_Dat
a_v2.0_tas_2018-07-25.pdf [https://perma.cc/WE62-XEBV]. Even if the departure rate was calculated
using all felony cases terminated—including dismissals, acquittals, and misdemeanor outcomes—
instead of estimated felony convictions alone, Oregon’s departure rate would still be much higher than
the rate in other states (7.7%).
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against persons or property crimes than in drug crimes, for example. Crimes
with victims also attract more public attention, making them targets for
mandatory minimum sentencing or enhanced-sentence legislation. 47 When
mandatory minimum and enhanced-sentencing provisions preempt guideline
application to a particular crime type, the number of upward departures for that
crime type may fall as well.
Oregon is an example of this form of guidelines displacement. In Oregon,
Measure 11 created minimum sentences for most violent offenses and many
other serious crimes, 48 essentially supplanting the presumptive sentencing
guidelines for those cases. 49 A later referendum (Measure 57) imposed
minimum sentences for a large group of drug and property offenses, taking
them outside of the guidelines as well. 50 That may help to explain why less than
eight percent of upward-departure sentences in Oregon are for crimes against
persons, compared to other states, where the rate of upward departures is
greatest for crimes against persons. 51 See Table 2.
Table 2. Crime Type Percentage of Total Upward Departures 52
person
State
KS
MN
NC
OR
WA

# cases
% of
up dep up dep
40.7
325
27.4
1540
28.2
2269
7.4
367
43.4
1712

property
drug
other
% of
# cases % of
# cases % of
# cases
up dep up dep up dep up dep up dep up dep
^
^
17.5
140 41.8^ 334^
27.3
1533
37.4 2100
8.0
447
32.3
2595
26.1 2097
13.3
1072
27.0
1336
49.0 2423
16.6
820
25.7
1015
14.5
572
16.3
643

^ In Kansas, “other” includes both property and other cases combined.

47. See, e.g., WASH. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMM’N, 20 YEARS IN SENTENCING: A LOOK AT
WASHINGTON STATE ADULT FELONY SENTENCING FISCAL YEARS 1989 TO 2008, at 49 (2010)
(“[T]he sentences most likely to receive an enhancement are generally violent sentences.”).
48. For a handy chart showing covered offenses and the mandatory minimum sentences for each,
see Measure 11 Crimes and Mandatory Minimum Sentences, MULTNOMAH CNTY., https://multco.us/dcjjuvenile/common-laws/measure-11 [https://perma.cc/378U-KN2U].
49. See id.; see also NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION, supra note 30,
at 77 (“In Oregon, the committee that had drafted and monitored the guidelines was disbanded, and
the guidelines were trumped by a broad-based mandatory minimum sentence law enacted in 1994.”).
50. OR. LEGIS. COMM. SERVS., BACKGROUND BRIEF ON FELONY SENTENCING 2–3 (2010)
(listing sentence enhancements under Measure 57 for drug and property crimes).
51. See, e.g., MINN. 2017 SENTENCING PRACTICES, supra note 46, at 33 (“Aggravated durational
departure rates were highest for intentional second-degree murder, assault in the first degree, and
criminal sexual conduct in the first degree.”).
52. Figures are calculated from data provided by sentencing commissions in each state. All figures
are for the years 2010–2017, except Oregon, where the data covers only 2016–2017.
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Broadening Presumptive-Sentencing Ranges

A second control on the number of upward departures in each state is the
breadth of the state’s presumptive-sentencing ranges. Some states deliberately
widened presumptive ranges after Blakely to allow judges to impose more severe
sentences without triggering Blakely protections—a move that led to a drop in
upward durational departures. 53 In states that had no presumptive ceiling on
terms of probation, 54 judges could extend probation terms without an upward
durational departure subject to Blakely. 55 North Carolina and Washington also
avoided upward dispositional departures altogether by including incarceration
in many 56 or all 57 presumptive-sentencing ranges.
C.

Bypassing Blakely

Even among sentences that are considered by a state to be upward
departures, because states interpret the reach of the Court’s Apprendi doctrine
differently, an upward departure may carry the right to a jury finding beyond a
reasonable doubt in one state but not in another. The number of sentences
affected by Blakely should shrink with narrow interpretations and grow with
broader ones.

53. See WASH. COMM’N, 2019 REVIEW, supra note 30, at 5, 16–18; MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES
COMM’N, 2018 SENTENCING PRACTICES: ANNUAL SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR FELONY
OFFENDERS SENTENCED IN 2018, at 31 (2019) [hereinafter MINN. 2018 SENTENCING PRACTICES]
(“In response to the Blakely decision, the 2005 Legislature widened the ranges on the Standard Grid to
15 percent below and 20 percent above the presumptive fixed sentenced, within which the court may
sentence without departure.”); MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMM’N, SENTENCING PRACTICES:
IMPACT OF BLAKELY AND EXPANDED RANGES ON SENTENCING GRID 6 (2010) (reporting that
“aggravated durational departures decreased from 6 to 3 percent” after Blakely and the legislature
widening the sentencing range); see also FRASE, JUST SENTENCING, supra note 4, at 126–27 (noting
expanded ranges to ease compliance with Blakely).
54. See, e.g., FRASE, JUST SENTENCING, supra note 4, at 126.
55. Minnesota added presumptive-probation terms this past year. See MINN. SENT’G
GUIDELINES COMM’N, 2020 REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, at app. 2.3 (2020) [hereinafter MINN.
2020 REPORT] (detailing an amendment that would make this departure subject to jury trial). The
minority report, however, warned that “[a]dopting the majority’s proposal for sentencing jury trials
regarding the length of probation will increase costs for all criminal-justice stakeholders . . . . The
judiciary, local county attorney offices, and the public-defense system will have to hear, prosecute, and
defend the new Blakely trials. And, the public will be obligated to serve as jurors. The minority is
concerned [about] the unprecedented, cost-increasing Blakely trial requirement . . . .” Id. at 110–11.
56. Of the seventy-two grid boxes on the Felony Punishment Chart in North Carolina, only three
did not include active punishment as an option. N.C. SENT’G & POL’Y ADVISORY COMM’N,
STRUCTURED SENTENCING TRAINING AND REFERENCE MANUAL 4 (2009).
57. See ROBINA INST. OF CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST., JURISDICTION PROFILE: WASHINGTON
5–7 (2019), https://sentencing.umn.edu/sites/sentencing.umn.edu/files/washington_profile_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3R59-L9D6].
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1. Exempting Upward Dispositional Departures from Blakely
One way to narrow Blakely’s reach is to exclude upward dispositional
departures altogether. 58 As noted above, Washington and North Carolina
accomplished this by including both nonincarceration and incarceration options
in their presumptive-sentencing ranges. 59 Kansas found a different way. Law
there recognizes that imposing incarceration instead of presumptive probation
is a dispositional departure but interprets Blakely narrowly to not reach this
situation. Kansas courts continue to adhere to a 2002 Kansas Supreme Court
decision that held that facts required for upward dispositional departures from
the presumptive sentence may be found by judges at sentencing. 60
This position may have made some sense in 2002, as the U.S. Supreme
Court’s 2000 decision in Apprendi involved a fact that lengthened the maximum
term of incarceration (a durational departure) and did not address probation or
suspended sentences (a dispositional departure). But it has been a tenuous
policy at least since 2013, when the Court held in Alleyne v. United States 61 that
any fact raising the floor of a permissible sentencing range must receive the same
treatment as a fact that raises the ceiling. 62 That the penalty is a more severe
type of punishment rather than a longer term of incarceration does not matter.
As stated in Alleyne, 63 increasing the “prescribed range of penalties” or
“expos[ing] a defendant to a punishment greater than that otherwise legally
prescribed” has the same constitutional meaning as raising the maximum term
of incarceration. 64 Nor does the discretion a judge retains under a presumptive58. A later section in this Article examines upward dispositional departures in more detail, finding
that almost all result from a plea agreement to a jail sentence rather than the presumptive-probation
term. See infra notes 110–17 and accompanying text.
59. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
60. Before Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), the Kansas Supreme Court held that the
U.S. Constitution did not require jury factfinding for an upward dispositional departure—imposing a
sentence of incarceration when the presumptive sentence is release on conditions. State v. Carr, 53
P.3d 843, 849–50 (Kan. 2002). The court reasoned that probation was an “act of grace,” not a right,
and that a judge’s decision to depart from a presumed probation sentence to a prison sentence did not
change the amount of punishment but only “determines where an individual’s sentence will be
supervised.” Id.
61. 570 U.S. 99 (2013).
62. Id. at 112–14.
63. Id. at 111–12 (“Consistent with common-law and early American practice, Apprendi concluded
that any ‘facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed’
are elements of the crime.” (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)) (emphasis
added)); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 483 n.10 (2002) (“[F]acts that expose a defendant to
a punishment greater than that otherwise legally prescribed were by definition ‘elements’ of a separate legal
offense.” (emphasis added)); Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 111–12 (“We held that the Sixth Amendment provides
defendants with the right to have a jury find those facts beyond a reasonable doubt. While Harris
limited Apprendi to facts increasing the statutory maximum, the principle applied in Apprendi applies
with equal force to facts increasing the mandatory minimum.”).
64. Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 111–12; see also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 601, 609 (2002) (applying
Apprendi to the facts that make a defendant eligible for the death penalty, expanding the “range of
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guidelines system to reject an upward departure appear to matter, as the Court
explained when it applied Apprendi to the presumptive sentencing guidelines in
Blakely. 65
Perhaps recognizing this, both Minnesota and Oregon treat upward
dispositional departures—two-thirds of all upward departures in those
states 66—the same as upward durational departures. 67 In Kansas, excluding
upward dispositional departures shrinks the number of cases subject to the
Blakely rule to an incredibly small 135 cases during the eight-year period
spanning from 2010 to 2017—averaging about sixteen cases per year. See Table
3.
Table 3. Type of Upward Departure—Dispositional or Durational 68
State
data
years

Upward
Dispositional
(“up dis.”)
up
% of
dis. all up
dep.

up
dur.

Upward
Durational
(“up dur.”)
up
any
both
up
dur.

Total
% of
all up
dep.

all up
dep.

KS
MN

2010–2017
2010–2017

664
3705

83.1
65.9

122
1530

13
213

135
1793

16.9
31.9

799
5620

OR

2016–2017

3106

62.8

1796

41

1837

37.1

4946

A different policy decision slashed the number of upward dispositional
departure cases reported in Minnesota. Until 2015, Minnesota followed the
same practice as Oregon and Kansas: counting as an upward dispositional
departure any sentence of incarceration when the presumed sentence was
probation, including dispositional departures the defendant seeks. 69 It is not

penalties” from incarceration only to incarceration or death). Undoubtedly a fact that would change a
presumptive sentence from a fine or incarceration to only incarceration would have the same effect.
65. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305 n.8 (2004) (“Whether the judicially determined
facts require a sentence enhancement or merely allow it, the verdict alone does not authorize the
sentence.”).
66. See infra text accompanying note 68 (displaying Table 3).
67. State v. Allen, 706 N.W.2d 40, 47 (Minn. 2005) (holding that a defendant has a Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial on the factors used to support a decision to sentence a defendant to an
executed prison term if a term of probation supervision is presumed to be appropriate under the
presumptive sentencing guidelines); State v. Frinell, 414 P.3d 430, 433 (Or. Ct. App. 2018) (same).
68. Calculated from data provided by the sentencing commissions in each state. Minnesota’s total
includes 122 consecutive upward-departure cases not counted in either the upward dispositional or
durational columns. See infra note 111 and accompanying text (displaying Table 6).
69. See, e.g., KAN. 2018 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 42, at 64 (explaining that a dispositional
departure occurs when incarceration is imposed instead of the recommended probation); OR. ADMIN.
R. 213-003-0001(6) (Westlaw through rules filed through Mar. 23, 2021) (“‘Dispositional departure’
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uncommon for a criminal defendant to request incarceration rather than
probation. 70 If the defendant is serving time on a different charge, opting for
incarceration rather than presumptive probation allows the defendant to
complete both sentences simultaneously, rather than serving a supervised term
on one offense only after completing a term of incarceration on the other. 71 Or,
instead of a probation term that would begin after sentencing, a defendant may
prefer a sentence of time-served—a term of incarceration equivalent to the time
already served in detention awaiting adjudication—which would end at
sentencing. Also, a defendant may regard compliance with the conditions of
probation as more onerous than serving a term of incarceration. 72
In 2015, the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission stopped
counting requests for prison as upward dispositional departures. 73 Reportedly,
trial judges demanded this change, after expressing concern that their individual
departure rates could be used against them politically and that including
incarceration sentences that defendants had a right to request distorted those
rates. 74 Before the change, these requests for incarceration rather than probation
constituted up to eighty-four percent of upward dispositional departures and
fifty-one percent of all upward departures in the state. 75 By 2017, because of the
change, the rate of upward dispositional departures in the state dropped from
3.3% of all cases to 0.8%. 76
As Part III will show, in every state, most upward departures, including
upward dispositional departures, are imposed because defendants ask for them,
means a sentence which imposes probation when the presumptive sentence is prison or prison when the
presumptive sentence is probation.” (emphasis added)).
70. See infra Section III.A.1.a.
71. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.135 subdiv. 7 (2020). For example, Minnesota limited the right
to request incarceration rather than release on conditions to cases with incarceration terms that were
concurrent with or consecutive to another incarceration term or were at least nine months in duration.
Id.
72. See, e.g., State v. Randolph, 316 N.W.2d 508, 510 (Minn. 1982) (holding that defendants have
a right to request incarceration rather than release on conditions—known in Minnesota as “execution
of sentence”—when the proposed conditions of probation are, in effect, more severe than the prison
term would be).
73. See MINN. 2018 SENTENCING PRACTICES, supra note 53, at 24.
74. Zoom Interview with Richard Frase, Professor, Univ. Minn. L. Sch., Kay Knapp, Consultant,
Robina Inst., Kelly Mitchell, Lecturer, Univ. Minn. L. Sch., Kevin Reitz, Professor, Univ. Minn. L.
Sch. & Richard Walker, Senior Judge, Kan. Ct. App. (Oct. 18, 2020).
75. MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMM’N, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 23 & n.50 (2017);
MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMM’N, 2013 SENTENCING PRACTICES: ANNUAL SUMMARY
STATISTICS FOR FELONY OFFENDERS 24 (2014).
76. MINN. 2018 SENTENCING PRACTICES, supra note 53, at 24 (“The aggravated dispositional
departure rate for [sentences in 2018 for offenses after the 2015 change] was 0.5 percent, compared to
6.3 percent for 2018 cases with offense dates prior to August 1, 2015.”); MINN. 2017 SENTENCING
PRACTICES, supra note 46, at 23 (noting that the rate of upward dispositional departures for those cases
with dates after the change was 1.1%, compared to 5.2% for 2017 cases with offense dates prior to August
1, 2015).
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either as part of a plea or sentence agreement or in anticipation of some other
benefit. Yet no state other than Minnesota has defined upward departures to
exclude a sentence that is more severe in type or duration than the sentences
permitted by the presumptive range because the defendant asked for that
sentence. This manipulation of upward-departure statistics in Minnesota did
not change the quantity of cases requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt to
a jury—a defendant who seeks an upward departure essentially waives that
right. 77 But it is another striking example of how states construct those statistics
differently.
2. Exempting Upward Durational Departures for Probation
Deliberately exempting probation terms that exceed the presumptive term
from the Blakely rule is yet another way to shrink the impact of that case.
Consider Kansas and Oregon. In both states, a term of probation that is longer
than the term in the presumptive-sentencing range is an upward durational
departure. 78 Indeed, analysis of Oregon data for 2015 and 2016 revealed that
these lengthened-probation terms constituted ninety-two percent of all upward
durational departures. Presumably, these upward departures, if not stipulated
or requested, would require the same jury factfinding beyond a reasonable doubt
as other upward departures, but so far Oregon and Kansas courts have yet to
admit that they do. 79 Meanwhile, in 2020, Minnesota adopted a contrary
position, that upward durational departures now carry the right to a jury
determination beyond a reasonable doubt. 80
3. Exempting Prior Juvenile Adjudications or Supervisory Status at the Time
of Commission
Relying on the “exception” to the Apprendi rule for prior convictions, 81 all
five states set increasingly severe presumptive-sentence ranges based on

77. For a discussion of waiver, see infra Section IV.B.
78. OR. ADMIN. R. 213-005-0016 (Westlaw through rules filed through Mar. 23, 2021); see also
State v. Hambright, 447 P.3d 972, 979–80 (Kan. 2019) (refusing to overrule earlier, pre-Apprendi
precedent—State v. Whitesell, 13 P.3d 887 (Kan. 2000)—and finding that imposition of a probation
term longer than the presumptive period is an upward durational departure requiring that the judge
state substantial and compelling reasons for departure).
79. See State v. Gutierrez, 112 P.3d 433, 434–35 (Or. 2005). In State v. Hambright, 447 P.3d 972
(Kan. 2019), the Kansas Supreme Court declined to address whether a defendant would have a right to
a jury determination, stating “[I]t is not abundantly clear that Apprendi would be applicable here.” Id.
at 979–80 (citing State v. Carr, 53 P.3d 843, 850 (Kan. 2002)).
80. See MINN. 2020 REPORT, supra note 55, at 101–19.
81. See Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 111 n.1 (2013) (reiterating the “narrow exception”
for the fact of a prior conviction (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 247
(1998))).
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increasingly severe criminal histories. 82 Thus, there is no right to a jury finding
of any of the prior convictions that make up the criminal history score, even
when a higher score raises the presumptive-sentencing range. This free pass to
use prior convictions to raise sentencing ranges also allows jurisdictions to
condition the imposition of sentences higher than the presumptive-guideline
range upon a judicial finding that a prior conviction was of a certain type, such
as a violent offense or a sex offense.
But states do not agree on whether a prior adjudication of juvenile
delinquency fits within the prior-conviction exception. 83 They also divide over
how to treat the fact that an offense was committed while under supervision (on
pretrial release, probation, or parole). Some states regard supervision status at
the time of offense as a fact that falls outside the prior-conviction exception and
thus it carries a right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt before a jury whenever
it raises the presumptive-sentencing range. 84 Others assume it falls within the
exception and rely on that status in the calculation of the criminal history
score. 85 In these latter states, the set of cases implicating Blakely would be much
82. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-6804 to -6805 (Westlaw through laws enacted during the
2021 Reg. Sess. of the Kan. Leg. effective on Apr. 1, 2021); MINN. SENT’G
GUIDELINES COMM’N, MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY § 2.C.1 &
cmt. 2.C.01 (2019) [hereinafter 2019 MINN. GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY]; 2014
N.C. STRUCTURED SENTENCING MANUAL, supra note 40, at 6; OR. ADMIN. R. 213-004-0001
(Westlaw through rules filed through Mar. 23, 2021); THE OREGON SENTENCING GUIDELINES
GRID, https://www.oregon.gov/cjc/resources/documents/guidelinesgrid.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XAV88VX]; WASH. STATE CASELOAD FORECAST COUNCIL, 2018 WASHINGTON STATE ADULT
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUEL 52 (2018); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.535(2)(b),
(d) (LEXIS through chapter 9 of the 2021 Reg. Sess.) (jury findings are not required for upward
departure if “[t]he defendant’s prior unscored misdemeanor or prior unscored foreign criminal history
results in a presumptive sentence that is clearly too lenient in light of the purpose of this chapter”).
83. See, e.g., State v. McFee, 721 N.W.2d 607, 619 (Minn. 2006) (allowing juvenile
adjudications); State v. Harris, 118 P.3d 236, 246 (Or. 2005) (en banc) (“[W]e hold that the use of
prior juvenile adjudications as sentencing factors in Oregon does not violate the jury trial right
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.”); State v. Weber, 149 P.3d 646, 648 (Wash. 2006) (en banc)
(holding that prior juvenile adjudications fall under “prior conviction” exception); see also RICHARD S.
FRASE, JULIAN V. ROBERTS, RHYS HESTER & KELLY LYN MITCHELL, CRIMINAL HISTORY
ENHANCEMENTS SOURCEBOOK 48–49 (2015).
84. North Carolina insists on proof beyond a reasonable doubt under Blakely for supervision or
custodial status as an enhancement factor, see, e.g., State v. Everette, 361 N.C. 646, 651–54, 652 S.E.2d
241, 244–45 (2007); State v. Wissink, 361 N.C. 418, 419, 645 S.E.2d 761, 761 (2007) (per curiam), as
does Oregon, see, e.g., State v. Gallino, 206 P.3d 204, 205 (Or. 2009); State v. Bray, 160 P.3d 983, 989
n.1, 990 (Or. 2007) (holding that “persistent involvement in similar offenses or repetitive assaults”
requires a jury finding). But see State v. Hinton, 263 N.C. App. 532, 538–41, 823 S.E.2d 667, 672–74
(2019) (declining to decide whether Blakely bars judicial finding under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A1340.16(b) that the defendant had a past judgment of a willful probation violation).
85. 2019 MINN. GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY, supra note 82, § 2.B.1 & cmt. 2.B.201; State
v. Brooks, 690 N.W.2d 160, 162–63 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (upholding use of “custody status” in
criminal history score as within the exception for prior convictions); State v. Jones, 149 P.3d 636, 640
(Wash. 2006) (en banc) (holding that facts “intimately related” to the conviction, including whether
the offense was committed while on release, fall within the exception for prior convictions); see also
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larger if it included every sentence in which a higher range depended upon a
finding that the offense was committed on release.
4. Other Blakely Exemptions
Additional Blakely carveouts divide these states. In a split decision,
Minnesota’s Supreme Court interpreted Blakely to allow a judge to determine
whether the facts proven to a jury or admitted by the defendant constitute
“particular cruelty,” 86 while Oregon, Kansas, and Washington submit similar
aggravating factors to juries. 87 States may also report sentences that the U.S.
Supreme Court has specifically excluded from Blakely protections as upward
departures. For example, some consecutive sentences are considered upward
departures carrying a right to a jury factfinding in Minnesota and Washington,
despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Oregon v. Ice, 88 which rejected that
rule under the U.S. Constitution. 89

WASH. STATE CASELOAD FORECAST COUNCIL, 2018 WASH. STATE ADULT SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL 52, 57 (2018) (including in the “offender score” the time between prior
offenses); Jones, 149 P.3d at 638 (analyzing the commission of an offense while on supervision); State
v. Brinkley, 369 P.3d 157, 160 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016) (outlining the timing of convictions). Courts in
other states without presumptive sentencing guidelines are divided over this question as well, see
authority collected in LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 13, § 26.4(i) n.248.
86. State v. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d 913, 921–22 (Minn. 2009) (“Blakely does not require a district
court to submit the aggravating factor of particular cruelty to a jury . . . .”). The dissent explained why
a jury must find this aggravating factor like any other and noted that Washington had drafted jury
instructions for its similar aggravating factor. Id. at 925–29 (Anderson, J., dissenting); see also William
W. Berry III & Carissa Byrne Hessick, Sixth Amendment Sentencing After Hurst, 66 UCLA L. REV.
448, 512 (2019) (“[T]he Blakely Court characterized the finding of ‘deliberate cruelty’ as an ‘aggravating
fact,’ and it is difficult to see how Minnesota’s ‘particular cruelty’ factor is any different.”). The other
holding in State v. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d 913 (Minn. 2009), that presumptive sentencing guidelines are
not subject to vagueness challenges, is also controversial. See Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886,
892 (2017) (distinguishing advisory guidelines, which are not subject to vagueness challenges, from
statutes that fix the range of permissible punishment, which are).
87. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6815(b), (c)(2)(B) (Westlaw through laws enacted during the 2021
Reg. Sess. of the Kan. Leg. effective on Apr. 1, 2021) (covering “excessive brutality”); OR. ADMIN. R.
213-008-0002(1)(b)(J) (Westlaw through rules filed through Mar. 23, 2021) (“The degree of harm or
loss [involved] . . . was significantly greater than typical for such an offense.”); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9.94A.535(3)(a) (LEXIS through chapter 9 of the 2021 Reg. Sess.). Professors William Berry
III and Carissa Hessick have argued that even the “substantial and compelling” decision reserved for
the judge should require a jury finding. See Berry & Hessick, supra note 86, at 514–17.
88. 555 U.S. 160 (2009).
89. Id. at 164, 172; see MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMM’N, MINNESOTA SENTENCING
GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY § 2.F (2020) [hereinafter 2020 MINN. GUIDELINES AND
COMMENTARY]; State v. Ice, 204 P.3d 1290, 1290 (Or. 2009) (per curiam); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9.94A.535 (LEXIS through chapter 9 of the 2021 Reg. Sess.). These are not common, and over the
eight-year period, only 122 cases with consecutive departures lacked either an upward dispositional or
upward durational departure. See infra note 111 and accompanying text (displaying Table 6).
With no need to comply with Blakely, consecutive sentences may provide an attractive substitute
for an upward departure. See FRASE, JUST SENTENCING, supra note 4, at 177–80, 198–201; Stemen &
Wilhelm, supra note 16, at 8.
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These varying interpretations of the Constitution’s commands can have a
dramatic effect on the volume of sentences that might carry a right to a jury
factfinding beyond a reasonable doubt for an aggravating fact.
*

*

*

Despite worries that it would be prohibitively expensive to provide the
right to a jury trial for aggravating facts, 90 the overall number of cases carrying
this right makes up a small subset of felony sentences. And yes, in Kansas—
exhibit A for the claim that the costs of Blakely are “small and manageable”—
the number of cases subject to the Blakely rule, as that rule is interpreted by
Kansas courts, is less than a couple dozen per year. This is indeed a miniscule
portion of the well over 10,000 felony sentences in Kansas annually. 91 But that
tiny number appears to be at least partially the result of uniquely narrow
interpretations of constitutional mandates, as well as choices concerning the
scope and design of the presumptive sentencing guidelines and sentencing laws,
that are unlike those of other states and the MPCS model. Other states, too,
have adopted controversial, if not arbitrary, policies that have shrunk the
number of upward departures subject to Blakely. In sum, the rate of upward
departures that might require proof beyond a reasonable doubt before a jury is
not inevitably as low as the rates reported by these states. Instead, that rate—
and the concept of upward departure itself—can be manipulated. Any
jurisdiction considering adopting presumptive sentencing should be aware of
the potential impact of these choices.
III. BARGAINING OVER UPWARD DEPARTURES: TOOLS TO ENGINEER
STIPULATED SENTENCES AND LEVERAGE PLEAS
This part examines the function of upward departures in bargaining.
Section III.A examines bargaining patterns in guilty plea cases with upward
departures, how often upward departures are not contested, and the reasons that
defendants and judges agree to them. Section III.B presents the claim by
supporters of presumptive sentencing guidelines that compared to mandatory
minimum sentences, upward departures transfer less sentencing power away
from judges to prosecutors. 92 Section III.C examines this claim using unique
data from Minnesota.

90. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 46, 68 and accompanying text (displaying Tables 1 & 3).
92. See infra notes 149–68 and accompanying text.
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Uncontested Upward Departures—A Tool To Engineer Stipulated Sentences

Reports from state sentencing commissions in Washington and
Minnesota 93 and interviews of practitioners and judges in Oregon and North
Carolina 94 suggested that almost all upward-departure sentences were not
contested by the defendant. Data provided from Minnesota, Washington, and
Kansas, and court records in Oregon, Kansas, and Minnesota confirmed this.
After documenting the low incidence of cases in which a defendant disputes an
upward departure, I turn to the reasons that defendants agree to them so often.
1. The Extent of Agreement
All but a small percentage of those convicted of a crime in the United
States plead guilty; trials are the exception. This appears to be true for cases
involving upward-departure sentences as well. In Washington, more than
eighty-six percent of defendants receiving upward-departure sentences pled
guilty. In the four other presumptive-guidelines states examined here,
defendants who receive upward-departure sentences went to trial at a rate that
is only slightly higher or even lower than the trial rate for felony defendants
generally. 95 See Table 4. Oregon’s low trial rate for cases with upward-departure
sentences 96 could be explained by the exclusion of most serious felonies from
Oregon’s guidelines 97 and the prevailing use of upward departures as bargaining
tools to avoid more severe sentences, discussed below.

93. See MINN. 2018 SENTENCING PRACTICES, supra note 53, at 22 (“[T]hese departure statistics
should be reviewed with an understanding that, when the court pronounces a particular sentence, there
is commonly agreement or acceptance among the other actors that the sentence is appropriate. Only a
small percent of cases (1%–2%) result in an appeal of the sentence . . . .”); see also WASH. COMM’N,
2019 REVIEW, supra note 30, at 5 (“[M]ost sentencing decisions are presented to the judge as an agreed
disposition. In 90+% of felony sentencings (a figure essentially the same across the country), the judge
hears both prosecution and defense ask for the same sentence. In Washington, that is almost always a
period of months of incarceration within the standard range set by the SRA.”).
94. These interviews were conducted in 2016 for a different project. See Nancy J. King & Ronald
F. Wright, The Invisible Revolution in Plea Bargaining: Managerial Judging and Judicial Participation in
Negotiations, 95 TEX. L. REV. 325, 338–55 nn.65–183, 361–92 nn.218–388 (2016) [hereinafter King &
Wright, Judicial Participation].
95. To check if the higher trial rate for departure sentences might reflect a different crime-type
mix, I compared trial rate by crime type for North Carolina and Kansas, the only two states where that
information was available. In those two states, with the exception of drug crimes, the trial rates for
upward-departure cases were higher than trial rates among all felonies of the same crime type.
96. See infra note 99.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 48–51.
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Table 4. Trial Rates, Total Adult Felony and Upward-Departure Cases
Compared 98
Trial Rate: Adult Felony
Trial Rate: Upward-Departure
Cases
Cases Only
KS^
3.2
4.3
MN
3.0
4.2
NC
2.2
4.0
OR
n/a 99
2.4
WA
5.3
13.2
^ KS felony cases include only guideline (“grid”) cases.
The trial rates for the aggravating facts that a state must prove before the
judge may impose these upward-departure sentences are even lower than the
trial rates for conviction reported in Table 4. This is because defendants
convicted at trial often waive the right to a jury trial of the aggravating fact and
opt for a bench trial instead or simply admit the aggravating fact. 100 For
example, in Minnesota, roughly one in four defendants receiving an upwarddeparture sentence after being convicted at trial did not contest that sentence. 101
Analysis of sentencing information provided by the states confirmed that
most of the upward departures were imposed with the agreement of the
98. Kansas, North Carolina, and Washington figures are from data provided by each state’s
sentencing commissions. The figures for the trial rate for adult felony cases in Minnesota are calculated
from data from the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission. MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES
COMM’N, 2014 SENTENCING PRACTICES: ANNUAL SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR FELONY
OFFENDERS (2015); MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMM’N, 2015 SENTENCING PRACTICES:
ANNUAL SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR FELONY OFFENDERS (2016); MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES
COMM’N, 2016 SENTENCING PRACTICES: ANNUAL SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR FELONY
OFFENDERS (2017); MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMMISSION, 2017 SENTENCING PRACTICES:
ANNUAL SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR FELONY OFFENDERS SENTENCED IN 2017 (2018). The figures
for the Minnesota trial rate for upward-departure cases only are calculated from data provided by the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission.
99. Information on the trial rate for all felony cases in Oregon in 2016 and 2017 was not available.
However, if the rates were similar to other years, it appears that the trial rate for upward-departure
cases is lower than the trial rate for all felonies, unlike the other states. See OR. JUD. DEP’T,
STATISTICAL REPORT RELATING TO THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE STATE OF OREGON 83 (2011),
https://www.courts.oregon.gov/about/Documents/2011_CircuitCourtCaseStatistics.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/5UUD-KDXP] (reporting a trial rate of all felony terminations as 4.4% in 2011); OR. JUD.
DEP’T, CASES TRIED ANALYSIS - MANNER OF DISPOSITION 1 (2018), https://www.
courts.oregon.gov/about/Documents/2018CasesTriedAnalysis-MannerofDisposition.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/29VU-2R24] (reporting a trial rate of 3.3% in 2018); OR. JUD. DEP’T, CASES TRIED
ANALYSIS - MANNER OF DISPOSITION 1 (2019), https://www.courts.oregon.gov/about/Documents/
2019CasesTriedAnalysis-MannerofDisposition.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ASW-8K9T] (reporting a trial
rate of 4.6% in 2019).
100. See infra notes 210, 216 and accompanying text (discussing waiver).
101. See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
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defendant, either as part of a plea agreement or because the defendant did not
contest the issue following their conviction at trial. Although it was not possible
to confirm whether or not the defendant agreed to the departure sentence in
many cases, among the discernable cases reported below in Table 5, it appears
that most of these upward departures were not contested. 102 In the sections that
follow, I detail some of the reasons why defendants choose not to contest
upward departures.
Table 5. Percentage of Upward-Departures Cases Where Information
Clearly Indicated That the Defendant Agreed to the Departure as Part of a
Plea Agreement, Stipulation, or Request 103
Percentage of Upward Departures
Clearly Agreed to
KS^
69.2
MN
74.9
51.0
OR
78.3
WA
^ Kansas reporting percentage of upward durational departures only, while other
states reporting percentage of all upward departures
2. Why Defendants Agree to Upward Departures
In theory, upward departures are supposed to be limited to cases in which
“the defendant’s conduct [in the offense of conviction] was significantly more
. . . serious than that typically involved in the commission of the crime in
question.” 104 Instead, this examination of the data and dockets available reveals
that upward departures are frequently imposed not to punish culpable behavior
102. Table 5 probably understates the extent of uncontested departures quite a bit. The lack of
notices in nine out of ten upward-departure cases settled by a plea in Minnesota, see infra Section III.C,
suggests that, in all those cases, the defendant had waived notice and agreed to that sentence as part of
a plea bargain. Rates of agreement were higher for plea cases with mixed departures (upward as well as
downward) than for plea cases with upward departures only. In Oregon, too, open pleas without a plea
agreement as to sentence are reportedly rare. See 2019 SAC GRANT REPORT, supra note 46, at 1 & n.2
(stating that, regarding cases concluding with at least one guilty plea, “[w]ith rare exception [the guilty
plea] represents a plea deal”).
103. Figures are from data provided by the sentencing commissions in each state, all for the years
from 2010 to 2017, except Oregon, with data from only 2016 to 2017. Figures exclude plea cases where
it was not clear from the docket sheet whether the defendant had agreed to the departure or the judge
determined it. In Oregon, this was a very large portion—forty-seven percent of guilty plea cases coded.
104. State v. Broten, 343 N.W.2d 38, 41 (Minn. 1984); see also State v. Cardenas, 914 P.2d 57, 61
(Wash. 1996) (noting that egregious conduct beyond that typical of the crime on a defendant’s part
may justify an exceptional sentence); MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G § 9.04 cmt. d (AM. L. INST.,
forthcoming 2021) (on file with author). For a thorough analysis of the debate about reserving
departures for circumstances related to proportionality of punishment rather than utilitarian reasons,
see MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G §§ 1.02(2)(a)(i), 9.05 cmt. e, 10.03 cmt. e (AM. L. INST.,
forthcoming 2021) (on file with author); Frase, Forty Years, supra note 14, at 111–12.
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or more dangerous offenders, but because an upward departure is the most
convenient way to reach a sentence—often a more lenient outcome—that the
parties prefer.
Before turning to the findings that support this claim, an explanation of
the information on which it is based may be helpful. In Kansas, Minnesota,
North Carolina, and Oregon, the judge is supposed to place the specific basis
for upward departure on the record—a plea agreement or stipulation to the
upward departure is not itself a sufficient reason for upward departure. 105
(Washington requires only that the judge find a stipulated sentence be
“consistent with and in furtherance of the interests of justice and the purposes
of the sentencing reform act.”) 106 Fortunately, information about the reasons
for upward departures was available for every state but North Carolina. 107 Even
so, specific reasons other than the defendant’s stipulation, request, or agreement
were not available in every case; in fifty to eighty percent of upward-departure
cases, depending on the state, neither the docket sheet nor sentencing data
provided any reason for the upward departure other than stipulation or plea
agreement. 108 The requirement of a separate reason must be difficult to enforce
in cases with uncontested upward departures, which will likely never be
appealed. 109
a. Opting for Incarceration
In a surprising number of cases, defendants preferred incarceration to
probation, agreeing to or requesting an upward dispositional departure to an

105. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6817(a)(4) (Westlaw through laws enacted during the 2021 Reg. Sess.
of the Kan. Leg. effective on Apr. 1, 2021); State v. Shull, 381 P.3d 499, 505–06 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016);
2020 MINN. GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY, supra note 89, § 2.D.1.c & cmt. 2.D.104 (“When a
plea agreement involves a departure from the presumptive sentence, the court should cite the reasons
that underlie the plea agreement or explain its reasons for accepting the negotiation.”); State v.
Misquadace, 644 N.W.2d 65, 71–72 (Minn. 2002) (holding that a plea agreement standing alone is not
a sufficient basis for an upward departure); 2014 N.C. STRUCTURED SENTENCING MANUAL, supra
note 40, at 20; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(c) (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2021-6 of the 2021 Reg.
Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.); OR. ADMIN. R. 213-008-0001 (Westlaw current with rules filed through
February 16, 2021); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.535 (LEXIS through chapter 9 of the 2021 Reg.
Sess.). Indeed, in Oregon, upward departure cases require two different reasons when sentencing to
both a dispositional and durational departure. State v. Ferrell, 933 P.2d 973, 975–76 (Or. Ct. App.
1997) (noting that the sentencing court must give distinct “substantial and compelling reasons” for the
additional durational departure).
106. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.535(2)(a) (LEXIS through chapter 9 of the 2021 Reg.
Sess.).
107. Reasons for upward-departure sentences were available from the state sentencing
commissions in Kansas, Minnesota, and Washington, and from notations on docket sheets in Kansas
and Oregon.
108. This does not mean one was not provided in the record, only that it did not appear in either
the data provided by the relevant state’s sentencing commission or in the docket sheets available.
109. See infra notes 132–35 and accompanying text.
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incarceration sentence. As explained earlier, 110 such defendants prefer a sentence
of time served rather than a new probation term, are (or will be) serving time
on another charge anyway, or wish to avoid onerous conditions of probation. In
all three of the states that distinguished between upward dispositional and
upward durational departures, a large proportion of upward dispositional
departures appeared to reflect this situation. More than eighty percent of
upward departures in Kansas were dispositional, and in Oregon and Minnesota,
two-thirds were dispositional, even though in Minnesota the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines Commission stopped counting requests for
incarceration as upward departures in 2015. See Table 6.
Table 6. Type of Upward Departure—Including Combinations 111
Upward Dispositional Departures

Upward Durational Departures

up dis

up dis

up dis

no dis

down

no dur

down

% all

up

dis up

dur

up dep

dur

dur

total

total

up

total

total

both

any up

any up

dur

depart

KS

503

161

664

83.1

122

0

122

13

135

799

MN

2888

815

3705

65.9

1274

256

1530

213

1793

5620

OR

3064

42

3106

62.8

709

1087

1796

41

1837

4946

A closer look at these cases is informative. In Oregon, almost all (ninetyseven percent) of the upward dispositional departures to incarceration from
probation were the result of pleas, and among cases in which the defendant’s
position on the aggravating factor could be determined, 112 ninety-nine percent
agreed to the upward departure. 113 They were almost entirely short jail
sentences of six months or less. 114 Seventy percent were convictions for drug
110. See supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text (discussing requests for incarceration rather than
probation in Minnesota).
111. Figures are calculated from the data provided by the state sentencing commissions in Kansas
and Minnesota from 2010 to 2017 and in Oregon from 2016 to 2017. The totals reported for Minnesota
upward dispositional departures include two cases with an upward consecutive departure as well; the
total for upward durational departures includes fifty cases with an upward consecutive departure also;
the total for any upward departures includes 122 cases in which the only upward departure was a
consecutive departure.
112. In Oregon, information about whether the defendant agreed to or contested the aggravating
factor, and the reasons for departure, was gleaned from docket sheets and appellate documents. See
supra note 33 and accompanying text.
113. Oregon law used to include the right to reject probation in favor of incarceration, State v.
Carmickle, 762 P.2d 290, 297 (Or. 1988), but that was changed by statute, OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 137.010(4) (Westlaw through laws enacted in the 2020 Reg. Sess. of the 80th Legis. Assemb.).
114. Ninety-three percent were jail; ninety-one percent had sentences of six months or less. The
short jail terms suggest most of these were time-served sentences exchanged for the plea.
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crimes. A small number of cases involved upward dispositional departures to
prison from presumptive jail, listing as reasons prison-exclusive programming
that was not available in jail or that the defendant was already serving another
term in prison. About one percent of upward dispositional departures were
combined with a downward durational departure. Similar patterns appeared in
Kansas 115 and Minnesota. 116
This pervasive use of upward dispositional departures to obtain a sentence
more favorable to the defendant muddles the meaning of upward departures. In
these cases, an upward-departure sentence does not indicate that the offense or
offender was extraordinarily bad. Certainly, some of them could have been. But
most of these cases suggest something entirely different—that pretrial
detention policies and not the presumptive sentencing guidelines are setting the
sentence at whatever time the defendant has already served while awaiting
disposition; that defendants consider supervised probation to be worse than
incarceration for one reason or another; or that if certain programming or
treatment was available while on probation or in jail, some defendants would
not be in prison.
If upward dispositional departures are not achieving the desired goal of
singling out the worst offenses or offenders, one option is to eliminate them
entirely by including an incarceration option in every presumptive-sentencing
range, as Washington does. 117 Alternatively, if preserving presumptive
probation is helpful in reducing the use of incarceration overall, reforms that
reduce pretrial detention, eliminate onerous terms of probation, and provide
more comprehensive programming options outside of prison could reduce this
routine use of upward dispositional departures.
b. Opting for Probation Instead of Incarceration, with a Longer Term if
Revoked
Unique to Oregon and Minnesota were upward durational departures
combined with downward dispositional departures to probation (also referred
115. In Kansas, almost all upward dispositional departures were from presumptive probation up to
incarceration. In twenty-nine percent of these cases, the reason for the departure was not clear, but
among the remaining cases, fifty-eight percent noted that the defendant had agreed to the departure
(twenty-six percent of these noted that the defendant had requested it, and twelve percent referenced
either “time served” or that the defendant was already serving a concurrent sentence). Only thirteen
percent of the upward dispositional departures to incarceration noted a reason that appeared to be one
the defendant might have contested, including being detained in jail rather than placed on probation
for immigration enforcement (indicated by “ICE hold” or “for deportation” notations).
116. In Minnesota, the upward dispositional departure sentences were to prison from probation
(as opposed to prison from jail), most with terms of just over a year. Of these, ninety-nine percent
were plea convictions, and fifty-five percent of these were upward departures requested by the
defendant, a small number of which were to obtain treatment or programming. A larger portion than
that in Oregon involved a downward durational departure as well—twenty-two percent.
117. See WASH. 2018 MANUAL, supra note 6, § 4.
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to as “down dis / up dur departures” in Table 6). In Oregon, as Table 6 reports,
this represented twenty-two percent of all upward-departure cases. Oregon
practitioners and judges explained in interviews for an earlier project that the
parties in these cases were avoiding the mandatory minimum sentences for
property offenses that apply under Measure 57 (as the only path to a downward
departure in Measure 57 cases is a stipulation by both parties). 118 Prosecutors
and judges had an extra incentive to do this in presumptive-prison cases in some
counties participating in the Justice Reinvestment Initiative, which provided
financial rewards for reduced reliance on imprisonment. 119 In exchange for the
prosecutor’s agreement to waive the mandatory minimum in favor of probation,
optimistic defendants agreed to serve a longer term of incarceration in the event
that their probation was revoked. 120
Data analysis was consistent with this account. Ninety-nine percent of
these upward durational / downward dispositional departures were guilty pleas,
with uncontested aggravating factors in ninety-seven percent of the cases in
which that information was available. 121 Moreover, in contrast to the drug-heavy
convictions seen in upward dispositional departures to jail, two-thirds of these
deals for longer terms of probation rather than incarceration were for property
offenses. 122
In Minnesota, too, similar plea bargains are unexceptional. As of 2020, of
the eighteen percent of offenders on probation for more than five years, most

118. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137.717(6) (Westlaw through laws enacted in the 2020 Reg. Sess.
of the 80th Legis. Assemb.) (mandating that Measure 57’s terms were required “unless the parties stipulate
otherwise or the court finds” that all of four enumerated mitigating factors are present (emphasis
added)); see also Act of July 25, 2013, ch. 649, §§ 5–16, 2013 OR. LAWS 1, 3–8 (codified in scattered
sections of OR. REV. STAT. ANN.) (including the proposed amendments in Measure 57).
119. See King & Wright, Judicial Participation, supra note 94, at 351–54 (discussing the Justice
Reinvestment Initiative and its mechanisms and results). But cf. George Ebo Browne, A Pre- and PostImplementation Assessment of Kansas’ HB 2170 Statute, 30 FED. SENT’G REP. 108, 112 (2017) (stating that
in Kansas “the use of JRI prison sanctions is perceived to have contributed to a higher number of
offenders in prison”).
120. See King & Wright, Judicial Participation, supra note 94, at 351–55. Relatedly, an Oregon judge
noted that “[prosecutors] often ask us to go outside the guidelines, the local practice here is to stipulate
to a grid block that is not necessarily the defendant’s actual grid block. The DAs favorite thing has been
for some time now, they’ll stipulate to a grid block that is much higher than the Defendant’s actual grid
block, but the client was willing to do this on the condition that there is a departure downward from
the presumptive sentence to probation. If he violates while on probation, he goes to prison for that
higher sentence . . . . The defendants all think they can do it. The DA knows that he’s not going to and
will get that prison sentence. We revoke probation on so many of these.” NANCY J. KING & RONALD
F. WRIGHT, MANAGERIAL JUDGING AND JUDICIAL PLEA NEGOTIATIONS: FURTHER EVIDENCE 21
(2017) [hereinafter KING & WRIGHT, MANAGERIAL JUDGING], https://ssrn.com/abstract=2972294
[https://perma.cc/5WE5-QEVK] (reporting additional quotations from field interviews for The
Invisible Revolution in Plea Bargaining: Managerial Judging and Judicial Participation in Negotiations, see
supra note 94).
121. This could be determined in seventy-two percent of guilty plea cases of this type.
122. Only four percent had a drug crime as the most serious offense.
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had opted for “a plea agreement in which the offender received a second chance:
no presumptive imprisonment in exchange for a longer length of probation
supervision.” 123 Data revealed that five percent of all upward-departure
sentences in the state involved a deal combining a downward dispositional
departure to probation and an upward durational departure on the stayed prison
sentence. 124 Rather than an option for judges to provide atypically punitive
sentences to atypically culpable defendants, upward departures in these cases
are tools prosecutors use for striking bargains with defendants who need not be
incarcerated.
c.

Swapping Upward Departures for Lesser Charges; Avoiding Mandatory
Minimum Sentences

Defendants also agreed to upward-departure sentences in return for charge
concessions from the prosecutor in the form of either fewer counts or a lesser
charge. 125 This arrangement allows the defendant to avoid a higher presumptive
range, a mandatory minimum sentence (by pleading to attempt, for example, to
avoid a minimum sentence for the completed crime 126), or an undesirable
collateral consequence for the charge the prosecutor agrees not to pursue (when
it qualifies as a “strike” for a recidivist statute, for example, or would lead to
deportation or sex offender registration). 127 A practitioner in Oregon explained
this was common, reporting that they would “pick the correct sentence and
engineer backwards.” 128
123. MINN. 2020 REPORT, supra note 55, at 115–16.
124. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (displaying Table 6).
125. For the years 2016 to 2017, a report found charge bargains to lesser offenses occurred in thirtyfive percent of crimes-against-persons cases but less than twenty percent for other crimes. See 2019
SAC GRANT REPORT, supra note 46, at 6 fig. 4.1.4; see also Shawn D. Bushway & Anne M. Piehl,
Measuring and Explaining Charge Bargaining, 23 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 105, 122 (2007)
(finding, in a study of charge bargaining and sentencing, that in Washington, reduced judicial
discretion shifted to charge reductions rather than sentence reductions); Richard S. Frase, The
Apprendi-Blakely Cases: Sentencing Reform Counter-Revolution, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 403,
425 (2007) (predicting that Blakely may increase charge bargaining).
126. See OR. CRIM. JUST. COMM’N, LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF THE APPLICATION OF
MEASURE 11 AND MANDATORY MINIMUMS IN OREGON 32 (2011) [hereinafter OR. CRIM. JUST.
COMM’N, LONGITUDINAL M11 STUDY] (finding that “after the passage of M11 the plea down process
changed and resulted in many more convictions for M11 attempts,” which are sentenced under the
guidelines at a lower seriousness level); see also Darryl K. Brown, Can Prosecutors Temper the Criminal
Code by Bringing Factually Baseless Charges and by Charging Nonexistent Crimes?, MARQUETTE LAW., Fall
2020, at 32, 33–36 (discussing “factually baseless pleas” that “provide a somewhat lower sentencing
range than is available under the original charge”).
127. See, e.g., Thea Johnson, Fictional Pleas, 94 IND. L.J. 855, 878–79 (2019) (noting judges accept
fictional pleas “to avoid trials” but also to avoid deportation of the defendant).
128. King & Wright, Judicial Participation, supra note 94, at 374 & n.284 (documenting the
observations of Oregon defense attorneys); see also id. at 353 n.163 (noting a judge who stated that
assault might be settled as attempt to get the parties’ desired sentence); KING & WRIGHT,
MANAGERIAL JUDGING, supra note 120, at 21 (noting Oregon defense attorneys who reported
stipulating to upward departures in return for charge concessions).
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As discussed earlier, depending upon your perspective, the prosecutor’s
ability to manipulate charges to control the sentence is either the most serious
threat there is to the coherence of presumptive sentencing guidelines 129 or the
most important power the prosecutor has to dispense leniency and avoid the
undesirable consequences of mandatory sentencing laws. Either way, charge
bargaining is inevitable, and the option of trading upward-departure sentences
for lesser charges provides even more options for the prosecution.
3. Why Judges Routinely Accept Stipulated Upward Departures
The examples above show how upward departures are used by the parties
for reasons unrelated to the purposes they are supposed to serve. In this section,
I briefly address the obvious question: Why are judges going along with this?
There is no doubt that they do. In Oregon, for example, docket sheets
suggested that judges were willing to facilitate upward departures when agreed
to by the parties even when the facts in the case did not necessarily support the
sentence or the sentencing-guideline range. Some docket notations candidly
indicated that the sentence ignored the “actual” guidelines sentence, with the
parties stipulating to (and the judge approving) a sentencing range other than
the one authorized by the guidelines before departing upward. 130
The reasons trial judges do not second guess these upward-departure
agreements are the same reasons that judges everywhere defer to plea
agreements. 131 There is little incentive for judges to object. And they do not
129. The U.S. Sentencing Commission adopted “relevant conduct” to reduce the effect that
charging manipulation by the prosecutor would have on punishment. See, e.g., Ruback & Wroblewski,
supra note 23, at 749 (“[R]eal offense elements . . . were incorporated into the guidelines as a way to
see through the prosecutorial charging decision to the actual offense the defendant committed. Because
prosecutors can, and often do, manipulate the number of charges against a defendant as a way to
pressure him or her into agreeing to a plea bargain, the guidelines developed rules for reducing
unfairness that might result from manipulating the number of charges against a defendant.”). The state
sentencing commissions in both Oregon and Washington also condemn mandatory minimum statutes
for ceding judicial sentencing authority to prosecutors. See OR. CRIM. JUST. COMM’N,
LONGITUDINAL M11 STUDY, supra note 126, at 44 (“M11 has combined in the prosecutorial function
both the charging and the sentencing decision . . . [and] drove more of the sentencing decisions to the
plea negotiation . . . . If the offender did not accept the proffered plea agreement, the prosecutor
terminated negotiations and sought conviction at trial, and if a M11 conviction was obtained the
decision making on the sentence was taken out of the judge’s hands.”); WASH. COMM’N, 2019 REVIEW,
supra note 30, at 5 (“The SRA took discretion away from the judges, leaving the prosecutors standing
alone in most cases as the only player with the duty and the authority — and the power — to fashion
a just result.”).
130. Among the reasons for departure noted were the following: “false grid block”; “[a]ctual gridblock is a 6-C, parties stipulate to a 6-E and an upward dispositional departure to 366 days in the
Oregon Department of Corrections”; and “[a]ctual grid-block is a 7-H, parties stipulate to a 6-D gridblock and an upward dispositional departure and 13 months DOC.” On the coding of docket sheets
from Oregon, see supra note 33.
131. See Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 959, 971–72 (2009) (reviewing why judges are unable to regulate factual representations affecting
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have to worry about being reversed. Oregon law bars appeal of a departure on
the ground that it was incorrect or not supported if the sentence was
stipulated. 132 Although Kansas, Minnesota, North Carolina, and Washington
permit parties to seek review of even a stipulated sentence for procedural
error, 133 appellate courts will not review the sentence itself if the appellant
agreed to it. 134 Not only do judges lack incentives to question the parties’
agreements, but there are also strong incentives to accept whatever the parties
propose, including preserving a favorable reputation for disposing of cases
quickly. 135
Even if some judges were inclined to check each stipulated sentence or
departure to ensure it was warranted and had a factual basis, they lack the means
to do so in some states. Presentence reports that might provide a basis for judges
to question the parties’ factual stipulations are authorized in each of the five
states 136 but practically unavailable in at least two. In Oregon, presentence
sentencing, including difficulty and cost, the belief that it is “not . . . their job to intervene actively in
plea bargaining,” and judges’ “strong self-interest in encouraging pleas” to avoid burdening their
courtrooms with trials); Nancy J. King, Judicial Oversight of Negotiated Sentences in a World of Bargained
Punishment, 58 STAN. L. REV. 293, 300–01 (2005); Susan R. Klein, Enhancing the Judicial Role in
Criminal Plea and Sentence Bargaining, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2023, 2028 (2006).
132. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 138.105(9), 138.115(7) (Westlaw through laws enacted in the 2020
Reg. Sess. of the 80th Legis. Assemb.) (“The appellate court has no authority to review any part of a
sentence resulting from a stipulated sentencing agreement between the state and the defendant.”).
133. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6820(e) (Westlaw through laws enacted during the 2021 Reg.
Sess. of the Kan. Leg. effective on Apr. 1, 2021); Spann v. State, 704 N.W.2d 486, 494–95 (Minn.
2005) (affirming a right to appeal even after entering a guilty plea); State v. Watkins, 939 P.2d 1243,
1244 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (“While a defendant normally cannot challenge a presumptive standard
range sentence, the defendant can challenge the procedure by which a sentence within the standard
range was imposed.” (citing State v. Ammons, 713 P.2d 719, 724 (Wash. 1986))); see also N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-1444(a2), (e) (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2021-6 of the 2021 Reg. Sess. of the Gen.
Assemb.) (providing for review by petition for writ of certiorari to the intermediate appellate court);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.585(7) (LEXIS through chapter 9 of the 2021 Reg. Sess.) (allowing
Washington State Department of Corrections to challenge an illegal sentence when the parties do not).
134. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6820(c)(2) (Westlaw); State v. Cooper, 394 P.3d 1194, 1196 (Kan.
Ct. App. 2017) (concluding that an appellate court shall not review a departure sentence resulting from
an agreement between the state and the defendant when the sentencing court approves it on the record
and there is no claim that the sentence is illegal); see also Kevin R. Reitz, Comparing Sentencing
Guidelines: Do US Systems Have Anything Worthwhile To Offer England and Wales?, in SENTENCING
GUIDELINES: EXPLORING THE ENGLISH MODEL 182, 194 (Andrew Ashworth & Julian V. Roberts
eds., 2013) (“Upward departures in Minnesota are reversed now and then, but in the absence of legal
error they are generally treated with deference by the appellate courts.”). Even the MPCS prohibits
appellate review of a sentence when it was “recommended” by the party appealing, unless it is
unconstitutional or outside the statutory range for the offense of conviction. MODEL PENAL CODE:
SENT’G § 10.10(4) (AM. L. INST., forthcoming 2021) (on file with author). Moreover, fact bargaining
by attorneys receives spotty disciplinary attention at best. See, e.g., Brent E. Newton, Recurring Ethical
Issues Related to Federal Sentencing, 43 J. LEGAL PROF. 35, 41 (2018) (noting that fact bargaining is not
unethical in all jurisdictions or contexts).
135. See King & Wright, Judicial Participation, supra note 94, at 359–64.
136. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6813 (Westlaw through laws enacted during the 2021 Reg. Sess. of
the Kan. Leg. effective on Apr. 1, 2021); MINN. STAT. § 609.115 (2020); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1332
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reports could provide a different version of the facts than what the parties offer,
but they are apparently uncommon except in sex offenses. 137 In Washington,
since the 2008 recession, presentence reports are reportedly used only for
offenders convicted of sex crimes or who may be mentally ill. 138 The willingness
to defer to stipulated facts delegates what would otherwise be judicial
sentencing power to the prosecutor.
4. Easy for Prosecutors To Establish a Factual Basis for an Upward Departure
Another reason so many defendants stipulate to aggravating facts for
upward departures may be that they decide contesting an alleged aggravating
fact would be futile. Establishing a factual basis for an upward departure takes
little effort in these states because it requires only one finding to open the
aggravated range and because many of the most common reasons used for
upward departure are simple to prove.

(LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2021-6 of the 2021 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 137.077, 144.791 (Westlaw through laws enacted in the 2020 Reg. Sess. of the 80th Legis.
Assemb.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.500 (LEXIS through chapter 9 of the 2021 Reg. Sess.);
WASH. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 7.1 (LEXIS through rules effective through Apr. 1, 2021). The MPCS
also provides that a presentence report must be produced “in any felony case in which incarceration or
probation in excess of time served is an option being considered by the court.” MODEL PENAL CODE:
SENT’G § 10.05(1) & cmt. b (AM. L. INST., forthcoming 2021) (on file with author). For information
generally about presentence reports, see William H. Pryor Jr., The Integral Role of Federal Probation
Officers in the Guidelines System, 81 FED. PROB. 13, 15–16, 15 n.25 (2017).
137. See King & Wright, Judicial Participation, supra note 94, at 378 & nn.307, 310 (providing
interviews with Oregon practitioners discussing the use of presentence reports in the state); KING &
WRIGHT, MANAGERIAL JUDGING, supra note 120, at 28 (collecting input from an Oregon judge,
prosecutor, and defense attorneys); see also OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 144.791(2) (Westlaw through laws
enacted in the 2020 Reg. Sess. of the 80th Legis. Assemb.) (discussing mandatory presentence reports
for felony sex offenses).
138. WASH. COMM’N, 2019 REVIEW, supra note 30, at 5 (“The SRA formalized [the stipulated
sentence] by calling for the parties to draft a plea agreement and to submit that agreement to the court
prior to sentencing. The judge then determines whether the plea agreement is in the ‘interests of
justice.’ If the judge finds that it is, the disposition can proceed. Theoretically, a judge could find the
agreement not just and reject it. However, under current practice, we give a judge no tools beyond the
representations of the parties to make this determination.”); id. at 5, 15–18 (concluding that
presumptive sentencing guidelines “took discretion away from the judges, leaving the prosecutors
standing alone in most cases as the only player with the duty and the authority—and the power—to
fashion a just result,” and including among recommendations to increase judicial discretion, reduce the
prosecutor’s ability to control the sentence, and increased access to presentence investigations); Drew,
supra note 40 (noting that felony presentence investigations are prepared by the DOC, not the superior
court itself, and that “[i]n the past, [pre-sentence investigations] were requested frequently, but as
budgets were affected by the recession, requests were limited to those who have been convicted of a
sex offense or who may be mentally ill” (quoting WASH. STATE SENT’G GUIDELINES COMM’N, PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORTS PROPOSAL 1 (2019))); see also WASH. SENT’G GUIDELINES
COMM’N, BLAKELY REPORT, supra note 41, at 12 (“Judges point out that in several large counties judges
do not have the time or information necessary to determine whether a plea agreement is ‘in the interest
of justice’ . . . prior to the acceptance of the guilty plea. Thus, in those counties, judges are unable, as
a practical matter, to exercise their discretion to reject a plea agreement.”).
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On the first point, compared to tried cases, plea-convicted cases were more
likely to involve only a single upward-departure factor. 139 For a guilty plea, with
a sentence relatively safe from appellate review, any substantial and compelling
reason to support an upward departure would do. By contrast, in tried cases,
appeal is much more likely and there is enough developing case law on what
findings count as substantial and compelling that prosecutors have good reason
to seek multiple aggravated findings as insurance against reversal. 140
On the second point, each state offers several easy to prove, frictionless
options to depart upward. 141 For example, proving a crime was committed while
the defendant was under supervision of some sort, if a state does not already
consider this within the exception for prior convictions, simply requires proving
the date of the offense and supervision status at that time. The popular
aggravators “persistent criminality” and “rapid recidivism” rely primarily on
criminal history. 142 Other easily established upward-departure factors include
the age or status of a victim, abuse of trust (easy to prove when the defendant
is a parent or caretaker), multiple victims or incidents per victim, or that the
crime occurred in the victim’s zone of privacy (home, car, or work). 143
139. For example, in Minnesota, sixty-five percent of plea cases had only one departure reason,
compared to fifty-two percent of cases that went to trial. Only nine percent of plea cases had three
departure reasons, compared to twenty-six percent of tried cases.
140. E.g., Hosley v. State, No. 27-CR-05-73277, 2012 WL 1069901, at *2–6 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr.
2, 2012) (holding that even though one aggravating factor the trial court relied on was impermissible,
the presence of other aggravating factors from the jury’s findings justified the upward departure in the
defendant’s sentence); State v. Coleman, 216 P.3d 479, 484–87 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (sustaining an
exceptional sentence in a first-degree robbery case based on a “presence of the victim” aggravator even
though the court found the consideration of “invasion of privacy” was improper since it is inherent in
the crime of conviction, thus finding harmless error); see also State v. Ochoa, No. 118,364, 2018 WL
5091856, at *12–15 (Kan. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2018) (unpublished table decision) (resulting in the jury
finding only one of three aggravating factors and that one was legally invalid).
141. A list of factors that would support an upward departure is provided in each jurisdiction, but
only in Washington is that enumerated list exclusive. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.535(3)
(LEXIS through chapter 9 of the 2021 Reg. Sess.). The other states permit reasons not on the list that
meet the “substantial and compelling” requirement for departure. See Sentencing Guidelines Resource
Center, supra note 19 (choose “In-Depth Jurisdiction Profiles”; then choose the relevant state’s
jurisdiction profile; then choose “Departures and Adjustments to Recommended Sentences” (detailing
whether that state’s list of upward-departure reasons is exclusive or not)).
142. See, e.g., State v. Schenewerk, 174 P.3d 1117, 1118–19 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (relying on criminal
history to employ a “‘persistent involvement’ in similar offenses” enhancement); State v. Beggio, 134
P.3d 1109, 1110 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) (employing a “persistent criminality” departure). In Washington,
courts may base an upward departure (“exceptional sentence”) on “rapid recidivism.” E.g., State v.
Bogart, No. 45787-0-I, 2001 WL 508370, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. May 14, 2001) (involving a crime
committed less than three months after release); see also State v. Murray, 416 P.3d 1225, 1229–30
(Wash. 2018) (holding that the rapid recidivism sentencing aggravator was not unconstitutionally
vague).
143. See, e.g., State v. Fields, No. CR-07-60, 2009 WL 982015, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 14,
2009) (upholding the use of the invasion-of-privacy aggravator where the defendant broke down the
victim’s apartment door); State v. Gainey, 261 N.C. App. 538, 818 S.E.2d 201, No. COA17-1422, 2018
WL 4441296, at *1–2 (2018) (unpublished table decision) (upholding the use of the victim’s old age as
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Additionally, several common mushy aggravators seem readily adaptable if
needed. A departure can be justified by a finding that the defendant is
dangerous, not “amenable to probation,” 144 demonstrates “lack of remorse,” 145
or caused more than typical harm or loss. 146 Indeed, that last reason would
theoretically fit any case in which an upward departure is exchanged for a charge
that describes acts less serious than the defendant’s. And as noted earlier, in
Washington, an “interests of justice” finding insulates any stipulated departure
from review. 147
To sum up, it appears that except for the small number of cases in which
the defendant contests the aggravating factor and demands proof before a judge
or jury, parties regularly use upward departures in ways not anticipated by the
sentencing guidelines. If prosecutors are concerned that judges will balk at
jointly engineered sentences, they need only shift their charging strategy to
pursue their own sentencing preferences and secure sentences that judges have
no power to reject. The drafters of the MPCS warned that allowing stipulation
or agreement alone to justify departures “could undermine every systemwide
policy built into a state’s guidelines, including correctional-resource
management and the reduction of racial and ethnic disparities in sentencing.” 148
This closer look at cases with stipulated upward departures illustrates how that
happens, as well as how difficult it would be to control.
B.

Upward Departures in Bargaining—The Policy Debate over Power

This subsection and the next will examine the claim made by advocates of
presumptive sentencing guidelines that, compared to mandatory minimum
an aggravating factor); State v. Muhammad, 242 N.C. App. 253, 775 S.E.2d 925, 2015 WL 4081835,
at *6–7 (2015) (unpublished table decision) (upholding the use of the victims’ young age as an
aggravating factor); State v. Sullivan, 104 P.3d 636, 638 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (applying the multiple
victims aggravating factor); State v. Matthews, No. 41189-0-II, 2013 WL 85326, at *3, *9–10 (Wash.
Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2013) (discussing the-abuse-of-trust aggravator where a defendant was guilty of firstdegree assault of a child but refusing to apply it simply for procedural reasons).
144. State v. Green, 172 P.3d 1213, 1219 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007) (“A sentencing court can rely on a
jury’s finding that a defendant is not amenable to probation as a substantial and compelling reason to
either increase the duration of a sentence or make a more restrictive disposition of a sentence or both.”);
see also State v. Fanning, 208 P.3d 530, 532 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (affirming the defendant’s conviction
after finding he had avoided prior opportunities to rehabilitate himself); Departure Report at 2, State
v. Krueth, No. KX-04-10480, 2006 WL 6549829 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Aug. 2, 2006) (listing as a common
reason for upward departure that a defendant “[h]as failed on probation/unamenable to probation”).
145. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.535(3)(q) (LEXIS through chapter 9 of the 2021 Reg.
Sess.).
146. See State v. Hicks, 864 N.W.2d 153, 157 (Minn. 2015) (“Generally, the district court may
impose an upward durational sentencing departure if the evidence shows that the defendant committed
the offense in a particularly serious way.”).
147. See supra note 106 and accompanying text; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.535(2)(a)
(LEXIS); In re Breedlove, 979 P.2d 417, 424–25 (Wash. 1999).
148. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G § 9.05 cmt. g (AM. L. INST., forthcoming 2021) (on file with
author); see also id. § 10.03(5) & cmt. g.
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sentences that follow from proof of an aggravating fact, an upward departure in
a presumptive-guidelines system preserves more sentencing discretion for
judges and shifts less sentencing power to prosecutors. 149 Are upward-departure
sentences used like mandatory sentencing statutes, as “bludgeons” to coerce
pleas? 150 Or do judges exercise discretion to undercut prosecutorial departure
preferences, providing less bargaining leverage to prosecutors than mandatory
sentencing provisions, which remove judicial discretion entirely?
To illustrate, assume a mandatory minimum statute provides that any
defendant convicted of assault must be sentenced to at least eighteen months of
incarceration if the victim of the assault was over seventy years old. Once the
prosecutor charges and proves assault, then proves the victim was seventy-eight
years old, the judge must impose eighteen months. This makes the prosecutor’s
threat to seek the enhancement quite powerful. Now assume the same case,
without the enhancement statute, in a presumptive-guidelines system where the
presumptive range for assault (given the defendant’s criminal history) is capped
at ten months’ incarceration, and a finding that the victim was seventy-eight
years old would support an upward departure. This finding would permit a term
of more than ten months but not require it. The judge would have discretion to
find that the victim’s age, once established, was not a substantial and compelling
reason for departing upward in the particular case (say, for example, if the victim
was—and appeared—extremely fit). 151 The prosecutor’s threat to seek an
upward-departure sentence if the defendant insisted on trial would not
149. See id. § 6.11 cmts. l–n, reporters’ notes b–c, l; FRASE, JUST SENTENCING, supra note 4, at
45–48, 57–62.
150. Gold, supra note 36 (manuscript at 547); see, e.g., BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS, supra
note 36, at 9, 54, 147 (asserting that lumping together binding sentencing guidelines with mandatory
minimum statutes—without distinguishing between the two—leads to “unchecked abuses” and
undermines the ability of judges to check prosecutorial overreach); Shawn D. Bushway & Anne M.
Piehl, Measuring and Explaining Charge Bargaining, 23 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 105, 109–10
(2007) (discussing hypotheses about how prosecutors choose to charge in a presumptive-guidelines
system). This has long been a criticism of the use of enhancements by federal prosecutors. E.g., Michael
A. Simons, Prosecutors as Punishment Theorists: Seeking Sentencing Justice, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 303,
341 (2009) (criticizing federal prosecutors’ use of “sentencing enhancements” as leverage to extract
pleas). The drafters of the MPCS worried about this too, warning that prosecutors’ ability to use such
threats in bargaining “could place great pressure on defendants to plead guilty to charges that overstate
their criminal behavior, and may coerce innocent defendants to ‘admit’ guilt.” MODEL PENAL CODE:
SENT’G § 10.03 cmt. g (AM. L. INST., forthcoming 2021) (on file with author).
151. On the judge’s discretion to reject a departure despite a factual finding, see KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-6817(b)(7) (Westlaw through laws enacted during the 2021 Reg. Sess. of the Kan. Leg. effective
on Apr. 1, 2021); 2019 MINN. GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY, supra note 82, § 2.D.1 & cmt.
2.D.102; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(a), (b) (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2021-6 of the 2021 Reg.
Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 136.785(5) (Westlaw through laws enacted in the
2020 Reg. Sess. of the 80th Legis. Assemb.); State v. Upton, 125 P.3d 713, 718–19 (Or. 2005) (en banc)
(“[I]t is the court, not the jury that makes the ultimate decision whether aggravating or mitigating facts
justify a sentence beyond or below the presumptive range.”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.537(6)
(LEXIS through chapter 9 of the 2021 Reg. Sess.); State v. Sage, 407 P.3d 359, 371 (Wash. Ct. App.
2017) (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.537(6) (LEXIS)).
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guarantee that a longer sentence would be imposed or how long it would be.
Moreover, if a judge could initiate an upward departure even without the
prosecutor’s consent, the prosecutor’s promise not to seek an upward departure
after a guilty plea would be weaker leverage as well.
Whether the prosecutor enjoys less leverage with an upward-departure
provision than a mandatory minimum statute depends upon whether judges in
presumptive-guidelines systems are willing and able to exercise their discretion
to upset the prosecution’s predictions. If judges routinely rubber-stamp the
upward departures that prosecutors seek and do not initiate upward departures
that prosecutors decline, they relinquish the sentencing discretion that
presumptive-guidelines systems supposedly protect. A look at how these issues
are playing out in these presumptive-guidelines states is not encouraging for
those hoping that the use of upward departures would regulate judicial
sentencing discretion without shifting it wholesale to the prosecution.
Starting with the power to initiate upward departures that the prosecutor
does not seek, only one of the five states grants judges this authority. 152 Fifteen
years ago, the Washington Sentencing Guidelines Commission listed its
reasons for refusing judges this power: (1) judges “frequently do not have
sufficient information to make an informed [decision]” before taking a guilty
plea; (2) even if the judge did have sufficient information, and provided notice
to the defendant so that they could withdraw his plea, “the result could have a
considerable disruptive influence on the orderly processing of cases”; and (3) it
“would improperly impinge upon the province of the prosecuting attorney,” for
just as judges may not increase the severity of charges, they may not increase
the severity of the sentence beyond what is “alleged by the prosecutor.” 153
Kansas permits judges to initiate upward departures by giving advance
notice, 154 but available information suggests they rarely do. In only 2 of the 135

152. North Carolina requires the state to provide notice of any enumerated aggravating factor at
least thirty days before trial or guilty plea and to include in the indictment any unenumerated basis for
an aggravated sentence. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(a6) (LEXIS). Although a statute appears to
provide this power in Minnesota, see MINN. STAT. § 631.20 (2020), reportedly the Minnesota Rules
of Criminal Procedure regarding an aggravated sentence have been interpreted to preclude judges from
initiating upward departures. See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 27.03 subdiv. 1(B)(3) (Westlaw through
amendments received through Jan. 1, 2021); see also MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.01 subdiv. 2(1) (Westlaw)
(stating that a plea colloquy requires the defendant to “[u]nderstand[] that the prosecutor is seeking a
sentence greater than the presumptive guideline sentence or an aggravated sentence.” (emphasis
added)).
153. WASH. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMM’N, BLAKELY REPORT, supra note 41, at 22–23.
154. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6817(a)(3) (Westlaw) (“If the court decides to depart on its own
volition, without a motion from the state or the defendant, the court shall notify all parties of its intent
and allow reasonable time for either party to respond if requested. The notice shall state the type of
departure intended by the court and the reasons and factors relied upon.”); KAN. SENT’G COMM’N,
KANSAS SENTENCING GUIDELINES DESK REFERENCE MANUAL 2016, at 91 (2016); see also MODEL
PENAL CODE: SENT’G § 10.07(7) (AM. L. INST., forthcoming 2021) (on file with author) (allowing a
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Kansas cases over the 8-year period in which an upward departure triggered a
right to a jury factfinding beyond a reasonable doubt did docket sheets or
appellate documents suggest that the judge initiated the upward departure.
Some of the same reasons listed by the Washington Sentencing Guidelines
Commission for denying judges this power may have led judges in Kansas not
to use it. The end effect on the bargaining power of the prosecutors is the
same—without judges willing to impose upward departures when prosecutors
decline to seek them, a prosecutor’s promise not to pursue a departure in return
for a guilty plea is just as convincing as a promise not to pursue a charge carrying
a mandatory minimum sentence. 155
C.

Upward Departures as Leverage for Pleas in Minnesota

It is more difficult to test empirically whether a prosecutor’s promise to
seek an upward departure if the defendant refuses a plea offer is as powerful an
incentive in bargaining as a promise to seek a mandatory minimum sentence. It
would require examining cases where prosecutors threatened to seek an upward
departure but that departure was not imposed. State sentencing commissions do
not have these data; state sentencing commissions collect information about
actual, not threatened, sentences.
Remarkably, however, Minnesota’s courts have for years collected data on
presentence events concerning upward departures and provided case
information for all adult felony convictions from 2010 to 2017 that included one
or more Blakely-related “events,” including whether a notice to seek an upward
departure had been filed. 156
Combining data on these roughly 2,800 noticed-but-not-imposed cases
with data on Minnesota’s 5,620 cases where an upward departure had been
imposed revealed two important patterns in bargaining.
First, in only three percent of cases convicted by plea with upwarddeparture sentences did the prosecutor file a notice to seek an upward
departure. 157 This makes sense if parties use upward-departure sentences
court to raise aggravating fact issues sua sponte so long as the court “allow[s] the parties reasonable
time to prepare for the proceeding”).
155. E.g., State v. Terning, 460 P.3d 382, 384 (Kan. Ct. App. 2020) (“The morning the case was
set for trial, [the defendant] entered into a plea agreement: [he] would plead no contest to the
aggravated kidnapping and rape charges; the State would withdraw its upward-departure
motion . . . .”).
156. After adopting rules and procedures for aggravated sentences following Blakely, see MINN.
STAT. § 244.10 subdiv. 5 (2020), Minnesota’s judicial branch included in its data collection for each
case information about if and when: (1) a prosecutor filed a notice of intent to seek an upward departure,
(2) the judge found (or did not find) evidence to support an aggravated departure at the Omnibus
hearing, (3) a judge ordered a bifurcated or unified trial at the Omnibus hearing, or (4) the defendant
waived trial on an aggravated factor. A second request for the same variables for cases with upward
departures imposed revealed no additional Blakely “events” in those cases.
157. See infra note 189.
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primarily at the negotiation stage, to engineer their desired outcomes, as
described earlier. If the agreed-upon sentence includes an upward departure,
the requirement that notice be filed in such cases could simply be waived.
Second and even more important is what the data reveal about cases in
which the prosecution did file a notice to seek an upward-departure sentence.
In only 10.5% of such cases was an upward-departure sentence imposed. This
makes sense if the primary function of providing early notice of the upward
departure is to secure a plea bargain that avoids that departure. Upward
departures have this in common with mandatory minimum sentences, which
prosecutors also use primarily as leverage to secure a trial waiver. 158 Like charges
carrying mandatory minimum sentences, most upward-departure sentences
appear to be dropped once a plea agreement is reached. 159
Reasons other than bargaining leverage seem less likely to explain why
nine times out of ten the prosecutor’s formal intent to seek an upward departure
did not produce a felony conviction with an upward-departure sentence.
Starting with plea-convicted cases, judicial rejection of the parties’ stipulation to
an upward departure in a plea-bargained case is not likely to account for a large
number of cases, for reasons discussed earlier. 160 In some of these cases
prosecutors may have secured guilty pleas to misdemeanors after noticing their
intent to seek an upward departure for a felony charge, 161 which would explain
their absence in the dataset of felony cases with upward departures provided by

158. See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., OR. CRIM. JUST. COMM’N, LONGITUDINAL M11 STUDY, supra note 126, at 41
(“From 1995-2008, only 28 percent of offenders indicted for a M11 offense were convicted of the most
serious offense for which a grand jury returned an indictment . . . . [T]he effect of the law was to push
tough choices about what the sentence should be in an individual case to the executive branch.”); Jeffery
T. Ulmer, Megan C. Kurlychek & John H. Kramer, Minimum Sentences, Prosecutorial Discretion and the
Imposition of Mandatory Minimum Sentences, 44 J. RSCH. CRIME & DELINQ. 427, 440 (2007) (finding
“significant support” for the hypothesis that mandatory-eligible offenders with negotiated plea
agreements will be less likely to receive mandatory minimums than comparable ones convicted by trial
in Pennsylvania); Mary Price, Weaponizing Justice: Mandatory Minimums, the Trial Penalty, and the
Purposes of Punishment, 31 FED. SENT’G REP. 309, 312 (2019); An Offer You Can’t Refuse: How US Federal
Prosecutors Force Drug Defendants To Plead Guilty, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 5, 2013),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/12/05/offer-you-cant-refuse/how-us-federal-prosecutors-force-drug
-defendants-plead# [https://perma.cc/MX63-4UWG] [hereinafter An Offer You Can’t Refuse]; Richard
A. Oppel Jr., Sentencing Shift Gives New Leverage to Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/26/us/tough-sentences-help-prosecutors-push-for-plea-bargains
.html [https://perma.cc/26RZ-68VC (dark archive)].
160. See supra notes 131–38 and accompanying text. Based on dismissal rates for felony charges in
large urban counties nationally, a judge’s pretrial dismissal, for a reason other than a plea bargain, of
the felony charge on which the prosecutor sought to depart before the defendant pled guilty to a
different felony would account for at most twenty-five percent of the cases. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST., FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2009 - STATISTICAL TABLES
24 tbl.21 (2013).
161. Nationally, about twelve percent of felony charges are resolved as misdemeanors, almost all
after a guilty plea. REAVES, supra note 160, at 22.
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the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission. But that would only
strengthen the conclusion that the threat of upward-departure sentences is
primarily used as leverage in bargaining.
Turning to the tried felony cases in Minnesota where notice to seek an
aggravated sentence was filed but no upward-departure sentence was
imposed, 162 I attempted to determine for each case why that happened. Did the
judge deny the prosecutor a requested upward departure, or did the upwarddeparture sentence fail to materialize for some other reason? Given the routine
use of easy-to-establish aggravating facts, 163 judges probably did not often find
that there was insufficient evidence that an aggravating fact existed. Nor were
they likely to have rejected a fact—especially one found by a jury—as
insufficiently substantial or compelling to justify an aggravated sentence. 164 Yet
based on the eighty-one tried cases with adequate information to explain the
absence of an upward-departure sentence the prosecutor had noticed, I found
that, in fourteen of those cases, the judge had declined to impose an upwarddeparture sentence after an aggravated fact was established. 165 If the same
pattern was present in the cases that were missing information, 166 it would
suggest that once an aggravated fact is proven at trial, the odds that a judge will
decline an upward departure the prosecutor seeks are about one in eight. 167 This
is admittedly speculative, but if it approximates what defendants believe,
defendants in Minnesota may proceed to trial with more hope of avoiding an
162. Using “jury trial held” or “court trial held” variables for each of the 198 cases where notice
had been filed but no data from the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission received, I
reviewed the docket sheet and any appellate opinion available (seventy-five percent of these tried cases
were appealed, mostly conviction-only challenges) and searched news reports. Six were guilty pleas,
not trials; three were consolidated, duplicating other cases; and nine others actually did have upwarddeparture sentences but were not in the data sent from the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
Commission. The cases were spread between thirty-four counties.
163. See supra Section III.A.4.
164. In Washington, “the jury’s finding in itself provides the trial court with a substantial and
compelling reason to impose such a sentence.” State v. Perry, 431 P.3d 543, 549 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018).
165. In half of these rejection cases, the jury found the aggravating fact, and in the other seven the
judge had. In some of these rejection cases, judges opted for top-of-range sentences or consecutive
sentences authorized without upward departure under section 609.035(6) of the Minnesota Statutes.
See MINN. STAT. § 609.035 subdiv. 6 (2020).
The other sixty-seven cases where there was no upward departure despite the prosecutor’s pursuit
of one were cases in which the judge could not have imposed an upward departure: eleven murder
convictions to mandatory life-without-parole, twelve cases with misdemeanor convictions only, three
cases where the judge rejected the aggravating factor before trial, three where the jury acquitted the
defendant of the felony associated with the upward departure, thirty-seven cases in which the
aggravated fact was never submitted to the factfinder for various other reasons, and just one where the
jury considered and rejected the aggravated fact.
166. Unfortunately, for only forty-five percent (eighty-one) of these cases was it possible to
determine from available information if an aggravating factor was even considered by the judge or jury.
167. This is assuming that in thirty-one (seventeen percent) of all 180 cases the judge declined to
impose an upward-departure sentence despite a finding, compared to 234 cases that went to trial and
ended in departure sentences.
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upward departure than the zero percent chance of avoiding a mandatory
minimum sentence upon proof of a triggering fact. At least in Minnesota, where
judges have occasionally exercised their discretion to reject upward departures
after trial, upward departures are a somewhat less potent “trial penalty.”
These unique data from Minnesota also suggest that prosecutors use the
notice of intent to seek an upward departure primarily as leverage to negotiate
a plea bargain that does not include that upward departure. 168 This use of
upward-departure notices resembles how prosecutors use charges carrying
mandatory minimum sentences in bargaining: most are threatened, then
dropped by the prosecutor, and the defendant need not fear imposition by the
judge once a plea agreement is reached. 169 Only in the small percentage of cases
that go to trial is there reason to credit the claim that judges retain more power
over departures in a presumptive-guidelines system than they do under
mandatory minimum sentencing statutes.
*

*

*

Part II presented the various policy choices and legal rulings that define
the parameters of cases subject to the procedural requirements of Blakely—a
cautionary tale for those states considering designing their own presumptiveguidelines system. The patterns revealed in Part III suggest that departures do
“tend to cluster in predictable ways,” allowing state sentencing commissions to
accurately predict the resources needed to accommodate policy changes, as the
MPCS asserts. 170 But it is less clear, at least as to upward departures, that the
MPCS is correct that under presumptive sentencing guidelines, “judicial
sentencing decisions within the superstructure of guidelines are the main
determinants of a state’s prison policy.” 171 Rather, it appears to be the
sentencing decisions of prosecutors, through charging and bargaining, that
determine these predictable patterns.
In four of the five states, judges have no power to seek a departure that
the prosecutor declines to seek, and in Kansas, judges use that power rarely.
And when a prosecutor or both parties do seek an upward-departure sentence,
judges in several states lack the tools or incentives they would need to reject it.
This leaves prosecutors free to use departures like they use mandatory
minimum and sentencing-enhancement statutes—as leverage to secure pleas.
168. Additionally, prosecutors use the notice of intent to discourage other actions. See State v.
McGinley, No. 119,781, 2019 WL 3850605, at *9 (Kan. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2019) (per curiam)
(unpublished table decision) (“[T]he State’s purpose in advising McGinley of its intent to withdraw
its latest plea offer and consider moving for an upward departure if McGinley proceeded to discharge
his attorney was to prevent delaying the trial which was only three days away.”).
169. See supra notes 152, 159 and accompanying text.
170. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G § 8.07 cmt. a (AM. L. INST., forthcoming 2021) (on file with
author).
171. Id. (emphasis added).
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Further, the findings from some states suggest that the parties use upward
departures in ways that are unrelated or even contrary to presumptive
sentencing guidelines’ goals of proportionality, uniformity, and transparency. 172
Prosecutors need not consider these goals when negotiating, and defense
counsel are bound to advance client goals, not state-sentencing policy. Instead
of restricting upward departures to cases that are “outside the realm of an
ordinary case within the class of cases defined in the guidelines,” 173 a significant
portion of upward departures routinely facilitate more leniency to defendants
than they may otherwise receive had there been no upward departure
available. 174
Finally, it is important to consider how the bargaining patterns revealed
here have the potential to distort sentencing policy. As Kelly Lyn Mitchell,
Executive Director of the Robina Institute of Criminal Law and Criminal
Justice, Chair of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, and
former President of the National Association of Sentencing Commissions, has
explained, one of the two fundamental reasons for a sentencing commission to
collect and report departure data is “so that it can serve as a feedback loop for
the commission and state legislature.” 175 It exposes “patterns and trends in
sentencing practices over time,” that might in turn reveal “offenses for which
the courts regularly impose departures, and such information is a signal that the
criminal justice system is dissatisfied with the recommended sentences under
the guidelines, or the laws for which the sentences are recommended, or
both.” 176 To the extent policymakers and courts rely on departure data when
identifying the “typical” sentence appropriate for a given charge, or to evaluate
departure reasons, these negotiated resolutions may distort those decisions.
Pleas to lesser offenses with upward departures to avoid a higher charge, “false
grid blocks” (fictitious presumptive ranges), 177 and stipulated aggravating facts
skew the empirical picture. They undermine what state sentencing commissions
tout as one of their most valuable attributes: accurate data needed for evidence172. E.g., State v. Barthman, 938 N.W.2d 257, 269–70 (Minn. 2020) (“The purpose of the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines ‘is to establish rational and consistent sentencing standards which
reduce sentencing disparity and ensure that sanctions following conviction of a felony are proportional
to the severity of the offense of conviction and the extent of the offender’s criminal history . . . . To
maintain uniformity and proportionality, departures from the presumptive guidelines sentence are
discouraged.’” (citation omitted) (quoting State v. Jackson, 749 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Minn. 2008))).
173. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G §§ 10.01(2)(a), 10.07 cmt. h (AM. L. INST., forthcoming
2021) (on file with author); see also State v. Hayden, 449 P.3d 445, 447 (Kan. Ct. App. 2019) (“[A]
sentencing departure must be supported by substantial and compelling reasons justifying a deviation
from the presumptive guidelines sentence . . . . ‘Compelling’ means that the court is forced, by the facts
of the case, to leave the status quo or go what is beyond ordinary.”).
174. See supra Section III.A.2.
175. Mitchell, supra note 19, at 35.
176. Id.
177. See supra notes 120, 130 and accompanying text.
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based sentencing policy. Charge and sentence bargaining and the fictions they
perpetuate are ubiquitous and certainly not limited to presumptive-guidelines
systems. 178 Indeed they might be even more prevalent in states without
presumptive sentencing guidelines. Nevertheless, understanding the extent and
nature of bargaining that produces sentencing data better equips consumers of
that information to interpret it.
IV. NOTICE, WAIVER, BIFURCATION, AND RETRIAL: THE PROCEDURAL
CONSEQUENCES OF LESS-THAN-FULL-ELEMENT STATUS
Four additional aspects of the adjudication of upward departures in
presumptive-guidelines states deserve attention, each related to the refusal to
treat aggravating facts as elements instead of sentencing factors: (1) the
provision of notice to the defendant of any aggravating factor that would
warrant an elevated sentence minimum or maximum, (2) waiver of the right to
demand that factor be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, (3)
bifurcation—separate consideration by the factfinder of the aggravating factor
only after a finding of guilt on the other elements of the offense, and (4) the
handling of aggravating factors after remand from a successful appeal. In some
of these states, the procedural protections regarding notice, waiver, and postappeal adjudication are not as exacting as they would be if the fact authorizing
a more severe penalty was treated as an element of the crime for all purposes.
This more relaxed approach has potential advantages for states seeking to tie
higher punishment ranges to the presence of aggravating facts beyond those
defined as part of the offense. But those advantages are also contingent upon
the continued legality of these practices.
A.

Notice

Ordinarily in these states, if the legislature had defined a lesser and greater
offense so that guilt of the greater offense depended upon the existence of a
particular fact, then that fact, as an element of the greater offense, would be
included in the charging instrument so that the defendant would know which
charges they were facing. 179 None of the five presumptive-guidelines states
178. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 127, at 897, 899–900 (collecting fictional pleas in multiple
jurisdictions and noting how they “slant the data about what sorts of crimes are being committed and
by whom”); Brown, supra note 126, at 36–37.
179. See State v. Serstock, 402 N.W.2d 514, 518 (Minn. 1987) (“[T]he indictment must contain
the elements of the offense charged.”); State v. Oldroyd, 271 N.C. App. 544, 545, 843 S.E.2d 478, 479
(2020) (“Indictments must state all essential and necessary elements of an offense in order to bestow
the trial court with jurisdiction.”); State v. Haji, 462 P.3d 1240, 1255 (Or. 2020) (“[T]o show that a
crime has been committed, it is essential for a grand jury indictment to include the facts supporting
the elements of the crime . . . .”); State v. McCarty, 998 P.2d 296, 299 (Wash. 2000) (en banc) (“It is
a well-settled rule that a charging document satisfies . . . constitutional principles only if it states all
the essential elements of the crime charged, both statutory and nonstatutory.”); State v. Brett, 892
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require the state to include any aggravating fact needed for an upwarddeparture sentence in the charges. Instead, each state requires the prosecution
to provide notice before trial or plea. 180 In Kansas, however, the court can decide
on its own to depart upward after conviction, so long as it provides reasonable
time for the parties to prepare before the sentencing hearing. 181 The MPCS,
too, provides that a prosecutor, with good cause, could seek a departure after the
defendant has been convicted. 182
P.2d 29, 39 (Wash. 1995) (en banc) (recognizing that Washington’s constitution, as well as the U.S.
Constitution, “require an information to include all statutory and common law elements of the crimes
charged”). But see State v. Dunn, 375 P.3d 332, 359–60 (Kan. 2016) (“A charging document’s failure
to include an element of a crime under the defining Kansas statute does not . . . necessarily meet the
statute-defined threshold for failure to charge a crime because the facts alleged, rather than the legal
elements regurgitated, determine whether the charge is sufficient under the statute defining the
crime.”).
For the other fact-based, range-raising devices—mandatory minimum and enhancement
statutes—sometimes states insist they be included in the charge, sometimes not. In Kansas, for example,
the sentence enhancements based on specified factfinding sometimes state that the factfinder must
determine the triggering fact, in which case the fact is included in the charging instrument and
submitted to the jury along with the other elements. Other enhancements or mandatory minimum facts
are found separately in a special verdict, after a general verdict on the other elements. In Minnesota,
facts triggering mandatory minimums, such as possession of a firearm, need not be included in the
charge. But see State v. Hugdahl, 458 P.3d 760, 763 (Wash. 2020) (“Sentencing enhancements must be
alleged in the information because they increase the sentence beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum.”).
180. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6817(b)(1) (Westlaw through laws enacted during the 2021 Reg.
Sess. of the Kan. Leg. effective on Apr. 25, 2021) (requiring a motion to seek an upward durational
departure sentence not less than thirty days prior to the date of trial); MINN. STAT. § 244.10 subdiv.
5 (2020) (stating that a prosecutor must provide “reasonable notice” of intent to seek aggravated
sentence); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 7.03 (Westlaw) (explaining that notice of grounds and factual basis
supporting aggravated sentence must be provided at least seven days before Omnibus hearing or later
if permitted by the court on good cause and on conditions that will not unfairly prejudice the
defendant); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.01 subdiv. 2 (Westlaw through amendments received through Jan.
1, 2021) (requiring a judge to advise a defendant of an upward departure before pleading guilty); State
v. Sawatzky, 125 P.3d 722, 727 (Or. 2005) (rejecting the need to include enhancement factors in the
indictment); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.537(1) (LEXIS through chapter 9 of the 2021
Reg. Sess.) (“At any time prior to trial or entry of the guilty plea if substantial rights of the defendant
are not prejudiced, the state may give notice that it is seeking a sentence above the standard sentencing
range.”); State v. Edwards, 261 N.C. App. 459, 472, 820 S.E.2d 862, 872 (2018) (explaining that the
statute requires written notice of intent to prove aggravating factors at least thirty days before trial or
plea). There is one exception. North Carolina requires that the prosecutor include in the charging
instrument any upward-departure factors not enumerated in the statute. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A1340.16(a4), (a6) (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2021-6 of the 2021 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.)
(explaining that any nonenumerated aggravating factor must be included in an indictment or other
charging instrument, but for factors enumerated in the statute, the state need only provide written
notice at least thirty days before trial or the entry of a guilty or no contest plea).
181. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6817(a) (Westlaw through laws enacted during the 2021 Reg. Sess. of
the Kan. Leg. effective on Apr. 25, 2021) (“If the court decides to depart on its own volition, without
a motion from the state or the defendant, the court shall notify all parties of its intent and allow
reasonable time for either party to respond if requested.”).
182. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G § 10.07 cmt. c (AM. L. INST., forthcoming 2021) (on file
with author) (explaining that “§ 10.07 does not treat jury-sentencing facts as elements of offenses”
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By treating aggravating facts differently than other elements for purposes
of notice, these states are running some risk that the Supreme Court may later
find that approach violates a defendant’s constitutional right to notice of the
charge. 183 The Court might reject the premise that a fact can be an element for
some purposes but not for others, 184 and conclude that belated notice of this
element comes too late when not provided until after conviction. 185 A state is
on shaky ground if it relies on legislative intent to treat the fact as a sentencing
factor rather than an element 186 after the Court has expressly rejected that
rationale. 187
Speculation about the long-term viability of this approach aside, it is clear
that treating a departure factor as something less than an element for purposes
of notice is helpful to the state. It obviates the need to include an allegation of
the departure factor in the initial charge or in the elements to be screened by
preliminary hearing or grand jury. The Washington Supreme Court, for
example, explained that “treating aggravators as the functional equivalent of
essential elements that must be pleaded in the charging document is harmful to
the public interest because it wastes valuable judicial resources and imposes too
heavy a burden on the criminal justice system.” 188

because requiring these allegations in the charging instrument would “impose heavy new burdens on
prosecutors”). The MPCS “suggests 20 days before trial as a feasible deadline for all parties in most
cases” but explains that where “the government may become aware of important sentencing
considerations shortly before trial, during the trial, or shortly afterward,” courts may “permit notice of
jury-sentencing facts later than normally envisioned,” so long as the defendant is allowed “reasonable
time to prepare for the proceeding at which the existence of a jury-sentencing fact will be determined.”
Id. (emphasis added).
183. See generally LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 13, § 19.2(c) (discussing the Sixth Amendment’s
notice requirement).
184. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G § 10.07 cmt. c (AM. L. INST., forthcoming 2021) (on file with
author) (“The Supreme Court has held that jury-sentencing facts are the ‘functional equivalent’ of
elements of offenses for purposes of the Sixth Amendment jury-trial guarantee, but the Court has never
held that they are elements of offenses for other purposes.”).
185. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 13, § 19.3 (collecting cases discussing whether the essential
elements requirement is based in the Sixth Amendment). States are not bound by the Fifth
Amendment’s Grand Jury Clause, which does require grand jury screening of every element. Hurtado
v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534–35 (1884); see also State v. Marshall, 334 P.3d 866, 875 (Kan. Ct. App.
2014) (finding that the notice provisions of section 21-6817 of the Kansas Statutes comport with the
Sixth Amendment as they “require[] the State to provide notice that it intends to seek an upward
sentencing departure and to provide information to the court regarding ‘the alleged fact or factors that
may increase the penalty’ no less than 30 days prior to trial, or 7 days from the arraignment if the trial
is to take place in less than 30 days”).
186. See, e.g., State v. Reinke, 309 P.3d 1059, 1062, 1073 (Or. 2013) (holding that under state and
federal constitutions, the legislature defines the elements of the offense that must be pled in an
indictment and, as a matter of legislative intent, a crime does not include sentence enhancement facts).
187. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306–07 (2004).
188. State v. Siers, 274 P.3d 358, 363–64 (Wash. 2012) (holding that neither the state nor federal
constitution requires aggravators to be alleged in an information, and that notice prior to trial was
sufficient).
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The information about notice collected from available data, docket sheets,
and appellate documents in Minnesota, Kansas, and Oregon underscores what
a drastic change it would be to require that the state allege upward departure
factors in the charging document. A motion or other formal notice alleging an
aggravating fact was often missing entirely—particularly in cases resolved by
plea. In ninety-five percent of cases in which upward departures were imposed
in Minnesota, prosecutors never filed a notice of the intent to seek such a
departure with the required factual allegations. 189 In Oregon, where an upward
departure is requested by motion, these motions were filed in only an estimated
thirteen percent of upward-departure cases. 190 In Kansas, fifty-five percent of
the 114 upward durational departure cases that were resolved by plea had notices
docketed, 191 but notices were often filed the same day as the plea agreement
when the departure was part of the deal. The lack of prior notice in so many
cases with upward-departure sentences is consistent with the bargaining
patterns noted earlier. If most upward departures are imposed at the request of
the defendant or exchanged for a charge or sentencing concession from the state,
the possibility of an upward departure may not even surface until negotiations
take shape, such that any notice requirements would be routinely waived.
Treating every aggravating factor as an element of a greater offense might
require the state to secure an amended charge before a defendant could admit
the factor if a simple waiver was not available. 192 Or it might prompt prosecutors
to include allegations of aggravating factors in charging documents for more
cases, a development that may further increase the pressure to plead guilty for
some defendants in order to avoid the departure. Alleging every aggravating
factor in the charges may also require abandoning some potential factors that
may not be clear at the outset of a case, such as lack of remorse or failing to
abide by conditions of pretrial release.
B.

Waiver

A second consequence of treating an aggravating factor as something less
than an element is that it may be easier for a prosecutor to secure a defendant’s

189. A felony case receiving an upward-departure sentence was nine times more likely to have had
notice if it went to trial—thirty-six percent of the upward-departure cases with conviction by trial had
notice compared to only four percent of the pleas, and only three percent of the plea cases where the
defendant agreed to the upward-departure sentence.
190. This rate varied between counties. For example, among counties with more than twenty
upward-departure cases coded, see supra note 33 (regarding coding of Oregon cases), the rate at which
a motion or notice was filed ranged from zero to twenty-two percent. In Oregon, half or more of the
trial cases had motions, compared to less than twenty percent of the plea-convicted cases.
191. Notice was evident in a higher percentage of the jury-tried cases—sixteen of the nineteen
upward durational departure cases that went to trial.
192. See, e.g., MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.08 (Westlaw through amendments received through Jan. 1,
2021).
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waiver of trial on that factor than it is to secure a knowing and voluntary waiver
of trial on the elements of the underlying offense. For the elements of the
underlying offense, guilty plea colloquies between the judge and the defendant
are scripted by court rule and case law to ensure that the record confirms
defendant’s understanding of the charge, sentence, and rights waived. 193 In
Minnesota, Kansas, and North Carolina, a defendant must complete a separate
colloquy, similar to a guilty plea colloquy, to waive trial on a factor supporting
an upward-departure sentence. 194 Yet courts in Washington and Oregon have
upheld waivers of trial on aggravating facts despite the absence of a formal
guilty plea colloquy like that required for the other elements of an offense. 195
This means that upward departures may provide more flexibility to the
prosecution than other fact-based, range-raising options that must be included
in a single guilty plea colloquy.
C.

Bifurcation

The assumption in these states that the aggravating factor supporting an
upward departure is not an element of the conviction has led to not only a
bifurcated and less formal plea process, but also a bifurcated trial process. This,
too, differs from the procedure that would apply if these aggravating factors
were treated as elements.
Typically, separate jury consideration of an aggravating element that
separates a lesser offense from a greater offense is limited to particularly

193. See generally LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 13, § 21.4.
194. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.01 (Westlaw) (setting out advisements for waiving trial on aggravating
sentence that mirror advisements for waiving trial); State v. Bennett, 347 P.3d 229, 235 (Kan. Ct. App.
2015) (holding that because waiver was not in accordance with section 21-6817(b)(4) of the Kansas
Statutes, a judicial factfinding for upward departure was invalid when the defendant was never advised
on the record of her right to have the aggravating factors determined by a unanimous jury beyond a
reasonable doubt, and did not waive that right, either orally or in writing); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A1022.1(c) (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2021-6 of the 2021 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.). But see State
v. Everette, 361 N.C. 646, 655–56, 652 S.E.2d 241, 246–48 (2007) (“[Although] North Carolina’s
Blakely Act now require[s] the trial court to address defendants personally, advise them that they are
entitled to a jury trial on any aggravating factors, and ensure that an admission is the result of an
informed choice. . . . [D]efense counsel’s admissions to the existence of an aggravating factor constitute Blakelycompliant admissions upon which an aggravated sentence may be imposed.” (emphasis added)); State v.
Satterwhite, 262 N.C. App. 374, 820 S.E.2d 135, No. COA18-249, 2018 WL 5796371, at *4
(unpublished table decision) (2018) (advising, “strongly,” that courts follow the colloquy).
195. See State v. Lafferty, 247 P.3d 1266, 1276–78 (Or. Ct. App. 2011) (noting that enhancement
facts must be tried to the jury during the guilt phase unless the court defers trial of such facts to the
sentencing phase or the defendant “makes a written waiver of the right to a jury trial on the
enhancement fact” and either “[a]dmits to the enhancement fact” or “[e]lects to have the enhancement
fact tried to the court”); see also State v. Trebilcock, 341 P.3d 1004, 1010–11 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.537(3) (LEXIS through chapter 6 of the 2021 Reg. Sess.) (noting
defendant’s stipulation is sufficient).
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prejudicial elements, such as those involving criminal history. 196 Lesser and
greater offenses separated by a single element—such as different degrees of a
crime like theft, assault, or homicide—are submitted to the jury together when
the defendant contests the aggravating element. 197 Courts do not ask juries to
find whether the defendant is guilty of the lesser offense, and then—only later,
at a separate proceeding or in a special verdict—ask the jury to find whether the
prosecution has met its burden of proof on the element required for the greater
offense. Instead, the defendant is entitled to a general verdict of guilt or
innocence on each charge. 198
States that adopted presumptive sentencing guidelines before Blakely did
not anticipate that facts needed for upward departures would be adjudicated as
elements of greater offenses. Rather, the determination of aggravating factors
for upward departures was to take place at the sentencing phase, following a
finding of guilt of the underlying offense and the preparation of a presentencing
report. 199 When Blakely was announced, the prospect of sequencing separate jury
trials, instructions, or verdicts for upward-departure factors was not welcome. 200
Bifurcation could take additional time, require new jury instructions, complicate
voir dire, and create additional litigation. Indeed, the Blakely dissenters warned
of this added burden. 201
Recognizing that some aggravating factors might be prejudicial to a jury’s
consideration of guilt on the underlying offense, 202 all five states examined here
196. See, e.g., Nancy J. King, Juries and Prior Convictions: Managing the Demise of the Prior Conviction
Exception to Apprendi, 67 SMU L. REV. 577, 586–87 (2014).
197. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 427 P.3d 907, 930 (Kan. 2018) (rejecting defendant’s challenge to
judge’s refusal to bifurcate murder trial, so that in the “first phase, the jury would determine whether
the State had proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that [the victim’s] death was a homicide” and, at a
second trial, “determine the degree of homicide that had been committed”).
198. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 513–14 (1995). Some jurisdictions do require judges
to instruct juries to decide guilt or innocence of the highest charge before moving to the lesser charge,
in part to avoid “uncertainty about whether retrial of the greater offense would be barred by the Double
Jeopardy Clause.” See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 13, § 24.8(d) & nn.54–58 (discussing acquittal-first
jurisdictions); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, When Should Jury’s Deliberation Proceed from Charged Offense to
Lesser-Included Offense, 26 A.L.R.5th 603, § 3 (1995) (discussing acquittal-first instructions). But I am
not aware of any jurisdictions that require the jury to deliver its verdict on the lesser charge before
considering the greater charge.
199. See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 299–300 (2004) (describing Washington’s
approach before announcing the decision).
200. See, e.g., supra note 18 and accompanying text.
201. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 336 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (warning of the costs of bifurcation); see also
Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 172 (2009) (declining to extend Apprendi to the factfinding required for
consecutive sentences, noting that otherwise, “bifurcated or trifurcated trials might often prove
necessary” and stating, “We will not so burden the Nation’s trial courts absent any genuine affront to
Apprendi’s instruction”); id. at 177 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing the Court’s warning of
bifurcated and trifurcated trials as “another déjà vu and déjà rejeté; we have watched it parade past
before, in several of our Apprendi-related opinions, and have not saluted”).
202. See, e.g., J.J. Prescott & Sonja Starr, Improving Criminal Jury Decision Making After the Blakely
Revolution, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 301, 304. For example, consider State v. Warren, 98 P.3d 1129, 1132,
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authorized bifurcated jury trials for upward departures 203 as well as special
verdicts. 204 A defendant could also waive their right to a trial on the aggravating
fact altogether after being convicted of the underlying offense, 205 or waive the
jury trial and opt for a bench trial on the aggravating factor. 206 Perpetuating this
approach, the MPCS terms these “jury-sentencing facts,” and posits that the
jury will “return a special verdict on a question of fact during sentencing
proceedings.” 207
Just how frequent and burdensome has bifurcation been in these
presumptive-guidelines states? Justice Breyer, dissenting in Blakely, observed
that the majority’s holding appeared to count on plea bargaining to ensure that
the burden was workable, as “more than 90% of defendants will not go to trial
even once, much less insist on two or more trials.” 208 His prediction was close.
In four of the five states, more than ninety-six percent of defendants with

1135 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (agreeing with defendant’s argument that he had a right to a jury
determination of the dangerous-offender aggravator based on a fact not pled in the indictment and
proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, namely, the fact that he was “suffering from a ‘severe
personality disorder indicating a propensity toward crimes that seriously endanger the life or safety of
another’” (quoting OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161.725(1)(a) (Westlaw through laws enacted in the 2020
Reg. Sess. of the 80th Leg. Assemb.))), and State v. Angilda, No. 106,226, 2013 WL 1234188, at *8–11
(Kan. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2013) (per curiam) (describing a bifurcated trial where the jury found the
defendant presented a risk of future dangerousness). Unfortunately, information was too incomplete
to reliably determine if bifurcated cases were associated with departure reasons that may have been
considered prejudicial at a unitary trial.
203. See, e.g., MINN. R. CRIM. P. 11.04 subdiv. 2(b) (Westlaw through amendments received
through Jan. 1, 2021) (stating that bifurcation is required “if the evidence supporting an aggravated
sentence includes evidence otherwise inadmissible at the guilt phase of the trial or if that evidence
would unfairly prejudice the defendant in the guilt phase”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6817(b)(1)–(2), (4)
(Westlaw through laws enacted during the 2021 Reg. Sess. of the Kan. Leg. effective on Apr. 1, 2021);
MINN. STAT. § 244.10, subdiv. 5(c) (2020); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(a1) (LEXIS through
Sess. Laws 2021-6 of the 2021 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 136.770(1),
(4) (Westlaw through laws enacted in the 2020 Reg. Sess. of the 80th Legis. Assemb.); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9.94A.537(4) (LEXIS through chapter 9 of the 2021 Reg. Sess.).
204. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6817(b)(7) (Westlaw); MINN. STAT. § 244.10, subdiv. 5(b); MINN.
R. CRIM. P. 11.04, subdiv. (2) (Westlaw); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.537(3) (LEXIS).
205. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1022.1 (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2021-6 of the 2021 Reg.
Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.) (“A defendant may admit to the existence of an aggravating factor or to the
existence of a prior record level point under G.S. 15A-1340.14(b)(7) before or after the trial of the
underlying felony.”).
206. See State v. Hayden, 364 P.3d 962, 966 (Kan. Ct. App. 2015) (discussing amended statute
that since 2011 has read, “If the jury at the upward durational departure sentence proceeding has been
waived, the upward durational departure sentence proceeding shall be conducted by the court” (quoting
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6817(b)(4) (Westlaw))). In North Carolina, however, where the state
constitution was only recently amended to allow bench trials, the statute regulating trials of aggravating
factors continues to say that if contested by the defendant, “only a jury may determine if an aggravating
factor is present in an offense.” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(a1) (LEXIS).
207. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G §§ 6.02 cmt. b, 10.07 (AM. L. INST., forthcoming 2021) (on
file with author) (emphasis added).
208. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 337 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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upward-departure sentences plead guilty. 209 Based on available information
from Oregon and Kansas, it appears that at least eighty percent of defendants
who pled guilty also admitted the aggravating fact and opted not to have the
judge determine the fact beyond a reasonable doubt. 210
For the small percentage of upward-departure cases that were not settled
by plea, a different picture emerged. Some information about bifurcation
practices could be found in the docket sheets and available appellate documents
in Kansas, Oregon, and Minnesota. 211 This limited information revealed that
many defendants receiving an upward-departure sentence after being convicted
at trial had admitted or stipulated to the aggravating fact—this included one in
four of such defendants in Minnesota, for example. 212 For defendants who
contested the aggravating fact, bifurcated adjudication was quite common. In
Kansas, eighty-nine percent of the upward-departure cases where juries
returned guilty verdicts were bifurcated into separate phases. 213 In Minnesota,
between thirty-five percent and sixty-four percent of jury trials in upwarddeparture cases were bifurcated. 214 In Oregon, roughly half of jury-tried cases
with upward departures were bifurcated. 215 Notably, bifurcation did not always
mean a separate jury decision; defendants often opted for the judge rather than
209. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (displaying Table 4).
210. In Kansas, the aggravating fact was admitted in 80.7% of cases, the fact was found at a bench
trial after the plea in 4.4% of cases, and for the remaining 15% of cases this could not be determined.
Among Oregon’s cases of upward departure after a plea, of the 58% of cases where this could be
determined, the defendant would usually—88% of the time—agree to the aggravating fact as well.
211. Minnesota data also included, of the roughly 2,800 cases with a notice to seek an upward
departure but no departure imposed, 25 cases with a pretrial finding supporting a bifurcated trial and 4
with a pretrial finding regarding a unified trial. (Judges need only make such findings pretrial if the
Omnibus hearing at which they must be made is not waived by the defendant. MINN. R. CRIM. P.
11.01, 11.04 subdiv. 2 (Westlaw through amendments received through Jan. 1, 2021).) Because these
novel “Blakely events” may have been docketed over the years with less consistency, I gathered what
information I could from docket sheets and appellate documents as well.
212. Admissions or stipulations to the aggravating fact appeared in twenty percent of the jury trials
and six percent of the bench trials.
213. In eight years, there were eighteen jury trial convictions where the defendant was sentenced
to an upward durational departure (the only type of departure that carries a right to a jury finding in
that state), and sixteen of those were bifurcated jury proceedings. One of the sixteen jury-conviction
cases involved a bench finding on the aggravating factor; the rest were jury findings. Of the other two
jury-conviction cases that were not bifurcated, one was a unified jury trial, the other involved a sentence
agreed to by the defendant after the jury’s guilty verdict. There was only one case with an upward
durational departure sentence that followed a bench trial conviction in Kansas.
214. In fifteen percent of jury-tried convictions there was a bench trial on the aggravating factor,
while twenty percent had separate jury phases with separate evidence, instructions, or deliberations.
Another twenty-nine percent had special verdicts on the aggravating factor which may or may not have
been delivered after separate instructions and deliberation. See also MINN. DIST. JUDGES ASS’N
COMM. ON CRIM. JURY INSTR. GUIDES, 10 MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES: MINNESOTA JURY
INSTRUCTION GUIDES § 3.04 (6th ed. 2020) (“After you return your verdict, there may be additional
issues for you to address and decide. I will instruct you further at that time.”).
215. Oregon’s cases with upward-departure sentences included an estimated seventy-eight jury
trials and forty-two bench trials during the two-year period examined.
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the jury to determine the aggravating fact. 216 In sum, the bifurcated jury
proceedings for upward departures predicted after Blakely have become a
regular feature of these presumptive-guidelines systems, but only for the small
set of defendants who opt for a jury trial and insist on contesting the aggravating
fact before a jury as well.
D.

Remand and Retrial of Aggravating Factors

There are two additional differences between current practice in these
states and the procedure that would apply if aggravating factors triggering
upward-departure sentences were considered elements for all purposes. Those
differences concern the retrial of aggravating facts or allegations of new
aggravating facts after remand.
Ordinarily, an appellate court that finds a sentencing error could simply
remand for resentencing, and the trial court need not retry the underlying
conviction. In these five states, courts continue to order retrial of the
aggravating fact alone, treating that fact as a sentencing factor. 217 Yet, this
procedure would not be allowed if these range-raising factors were truly
elements, as the U.S. Supreme Court has suggested. 218
Assume, for example, that a defendant convicted of armed robbery appeals
their conviction, alleging a procedural error regarding the “armed” element that
separates the lesser offense of robbery from the greater offense of armed
robbery, based on a bad jury instruction or evidentiary error. Upon finding a
procedural error regarding that element, an appellate court would have three
options. It could (1) find the error was harmless, 219 (2) remand for the trial court
to order resentencing on the lesser offense without that aggravating element, or
(3) remand the case for retrial of the entire offense (armed robbery). Allowing
the prosecutor a second bite at just the “armed” element while preventing the
defendant from contesting the other elements would not be an option. Retrying
the aggravating element alone would deprive the defendant of their right to a
general verdict. 220 And it would violate the defendant’s double jeopardy rights
to retry all the elements but instruct the jury to find the elements other than
the weapon element as established by the prior trial, thus directing a verdict of
guilty on those elements. 221 The same limitations should apply if states actually
216. See supra notes 214–15 and accompanying text.
217. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 745 N.W.2d 845, 851 (Minn. 2008).
218. See supra notes 28, 63–64 and accompanying text.
219. See, e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 4 (1999) (holding that a judge’s failure to instruct
the jury on an element can be harmless error).
220. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 13, § 26.4(i) & nn.260–264.50 (collecting authority).
221. Id.; see also id. § 17.4(a) (collecting authority); Simpson v. Florida, 403 U.S. 384, 386 (1971)
(“[H]ad the second trial never occurred, the prosecutor could not, while trying the case under review,
have laid the first jury verdict before the trial judge and demanded an instruction to the jury that, as a
matter of law, petitioner was one of the armed robbers in the store that night.”); State v. Stiefel, 256
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treated the aggravating factor separating the presumptive punishment from a
departure punishment as an element of the offense. Instead, these states appear
to assume this fact that raises the sentencing range is just a sentencing factor.
Similarly, treating an aggravating factor as an element would jeopardize
several state court decisions holding that a prosecutor’s decision to add an
upward-departure allegation after remand is not the same as a prosecutor’s
decision to add a higher charge. 222 In Blackledge v. Perry, 223 the Supreme Court
held that adding a higher charge after remand raises a presumption of
vindictiveness, in violation of due process. 224 If the aggravating factor was truly
an element of a greater offense, prosecutors who respond to a successful appeal
by seeking an upward departure on remand would have to comply with the same
due process restrictions they would face if they responded by raising the
charge. 225
*

*

*

This part turned from negotiated dispositions to contested cases and
focused on the differences between procedures used to adjudicate ordinaryoffense elements and procedures these five states use to adjudicate aggravating
factors for upward-departure sentences. By continuing to treat factfinding for
upward departures as a matter of sentencing and not guilt, prosecutors in at
least some of the states examined here benefit from several procedural shortcuts
unavailable for adjudicating ordinary offense elements. These shortcuts include
omitting allegations of facts needed for the higher sentence from the charging
instrument, avoiding screening those allegations for probable cause at a
preliminary hearing or indictment, reducing the formality of and separating
waivers of trial, reserving a second chance to prove the facts for an aggravated
sentence on remand without retrying the other elements of the offense, and
So. 2d 581, 585 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that such a procedure “would be impermissible, of
course, under due process considerations which assure an accused a jury trial on all issues relating to
each element of a given criminal charge”). For example, take the case State v. Davis, 335 P.3d 1266
(Or. Ct. App. 2014), which held that the State’s issue preclusion instruction removed an element from
the jury’s consideration in violation of defendant’s right to a jury trial when, after remand, the jury was
told “[b]oth sides have had full and fair opportunity to litigate whether or not the defendant was the
driver. And the jury made the determination, they did their work just like you. And so we must accept
the fact that the defendant is the driver when we evaluate this case.” Id. at 1275.
222. See State v. Brown, 440 P.3d 962, 971 (Wash. 2019) (“Unlike cases where the prosecution
chooses to add charges after a defendant exercises his right of appeal and succeeds, this case involves a
sentencing recommendation . . . . [W]e decline to extend the Blackledge presumption in this context.”);
see also State v. Sierra, 399 P.3d 987, 990 (Or. 2017) (rejecting Due Process Clause and Double
Jeopardy Clause challenges when the State alleged after remand, and the jury found, four significant
enhancement factors that had not been alleged or found during the original trial).
223. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
224. Id. at 28–29 (finding a presumption of vindictiveness upon the addition of a higher charge
after the defendant’s first appeal).
225. See generally LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 13, § 13.5(a) (discussing vindictive charging).
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adding more serious charges after a defendant’s successful appeal without
certain constitutional limits. 226
It is possible that the Court’s future application of its Apprendi doctrine
may rule out some of these practices, making it more costly to use upwarddeparture sentences in presumptive-guidelines systems. If that happens,
hopefully states will not substitute even heavier reliance upon criminal history
to calibrate sentences, as Kansas has done. 227 Because courts presently exempt
the fact of prior conviction from Blakely’s protections, such a move may be
tempting. However, as Professors Richard Frase and Julian Roberts have
documented, even if using criminal history is a cheap and easy option for
parsing penalties in the short run, research reveals that it could exacerbate racial
disparities and undermine crime-reduction efforts in the long run. 228
CONCLUSION
This study of how presumptive-guidelines states have handled compliance
with Blakely revealed several surprising practices. Some are at odds with
theoretical explanations for presumptive sentencing guidelines, 229 and others
are inconsistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s characterization of rangeraising facts as elements. 230 But it is important not to leap to conclusions about
the relative value of presumptive guidelines compared to other sentencing
systems based on these limited findings. A concerning practice that is common
under presumptive sentencing guidelines (say, plea agreements that trade a
higher sentence for a lesser, less accurate, charge) may be even more prevalent
in states without presumptive sentencing guidelines. It is also possible that any
costs or concerns raised by the way states process cases with upward-departure
sentences 231 are outweighed by the potential benefits of presumptive
sentencing, particularly if research demonstrates that presumptive sentencing
226. The second-class status of aggravating facts arguably has one potential benefit for the
defendant, too: judges may be more open to bifurcating trials when evidence of the aggravating fact
would not normally be part of the proof of other elements, allowing a defendant to seek a jury verdict
on other elements before exposing jurors to aggravating factors that may otherwise create prejudice.
227. See KANSAS 2018 MANUAL, supra note 43, at 27–35 (listing sentence enhancements based on
criminal history); see also Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 30, at 1715 (describing proposal to permit
upward departures based on criminal history but not on other grounds).
228. FRASE & ROBERTS, supra note 30, at 77–83, 133–51 (collecting research on the lack of crime
reduction and the disproportionate impact on minority defendants).
229. See supra Section III.A.
230. See supra Part IV.
231. The study was limited to the relatively small fraction of cases with upward-departure
sentences; downward departures are much more common. See Richard S. Frase & Kelly Lyn Mitchell,
Why Are Minnesota’s Prison Populations Continuing To Rise in an Era of Decarceration?, 30 FED. SENT’G
REP. 114, 117 (2017) (noting between 2011 and 2015 nine times as many downward as upward durational
departures in Minnesota); STATE OF WASH. CASELOAD FORECAST COUNCIL, STATISTICAL
SUMMARY OF ADULT FELONY SENTENCING: FISCAL YEAR 2017, at ix (2018) (showing that 23% of
exceptional sentences increased the term of confinement above the range; 60.3% reduced below).
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guidelines can help a state implement alternative responses to crime, shrink
racial inequality, and reduce overreliance on criminal history, incarceration, and
counterproductive terms and conditions of community release.
With those caveats in mind, the findings suggest three potentially useful
lessons. First, the power to seek or promise not to seek upward departures in
these presumptive-guidelines systems enhances prosecutorial power to
manipulate punishment and secure plea agreements. At least when judges lack
the tools, authority, or incentive to disrupt stipulated agreements, prosecutors
control not only the charge, but also whether a defendant will receive an
upward-departure sentence for that charge if convicted. With no need to limit
upward departures to cases a judge would agree warrant exceptionally severe
penalties, upward departures are available for routine use in bargaining—sought
with the expectation that they will be dropped as part of a deal, handy whenever
defendants prefer incarceration to probation, traded for lesser or different
charges, or layered with downward departures to reach an outcome both sides
can live with. 232 This Article is not the place to tackle the regulation of charging
and sentencing bargaining—others, including the drafters of the MPCS, have
tried. 233 It is enough to note that the findings illustrate how plea bargaining, the
black hole that consumes and exploits almost every effort to regulate
punishment, has absorbed upward departures in these presumptive-guidelines
states.
The findings here also reinforce the need to be careful about what
sentencing information means, especially in presumptive-guidelines
jurisdictions where sentencing data often directs policy decisions. When all but
a small percentage of convictions and sentences are the product of negotiation,
and neither trial nor appellate judges enforce factual-basis requirements or
question stipulations, 234 those convictions and sentences lose reliability as
records of fact. At most, they mark the charge and sentence factors that the
prosecutor and the defendant would agree to. An upward-departure sentence
232. See supra Section III.A.
233. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G 25–26 (AM. L. INST., forthcoming 2021) (on file with author)
(listing provisions that would regulate deferred-prosecution agreements, authorize deferred
adjudication without a prosecutor’s agreement, provide that deferred adjudication “not be conditioned
on a guilty plea,” allow a court to consider offenders’ “substantial assistance” to the government as a
mitigating factor at sentencing without government agreement, invalidate certain waivers of appeal,
provide appellate relief for disproportionately severe sentences, ban the use of acquitted conduct, and
more). Washington, for example, tried optional prosecutorial guidelines, which, unsurprisingly, many
local offices have opted not to follow. See WASH. COMM’N, 2019 REVIEW, supra note 30, at 11
(reporting these guidelines “are routinely followed in some prosecutor’s offices more than others” and
mentioning an “[u]neven application of some enhancements, most of which are essentially mandatory
minimums”); see also Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial SelfRegulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1010, 1022–25 (2005) (discussing attempts by sentencing commissions
to regulate charging and bargaining).
234. See supra Section III.A.
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does not reliably indicate an unusually severe offense or culpable offender.
Rather, the prosecutor may have decided to seek a departure for a reason that
has nothing to do with how serious the defendant’s crime or criminal record
truly was. For example, a surge in the numbers of upward-departure sentences
for attempted crimes does not demonstrate that the presumptive sentences for
attempt are too low and need upward adjustment or that police have improved
their ability to intercept crime before offenses have been completed. Instead,
upward departures combined with substituting attempt for a completed crime
may have been the easiest way for the parties to avoid a higher, perhaps
mandatory minimum, sentence for the completed crime. 235
Finally, this project exposes how states with presumptive sentencing
guidelines have navigated uncertainty about the scope of the Apprendi doctrine
and resisted its expansion. 236 Even before this past Term’s novel application of
Apprendi to the revocation of release, 237 multiple questions already divided these
states. Do upward dispositional departures from probation or durational
departures from a presumptive-probation term implicate the Blakely rule? 238
Which facts related to prior convictions, if any, are exempt under the exception
for prior convictions? 239 Is an aggravating factor authorizing a more severe range
of punishment an “element” for purposes other than the right to a jury finding
beyond a reasonable doubt, such as notice, waiver, or double jeopardy? 240 Any
jurisdiction that is considering presumptive sentencing guidelines must
anticipate these constitutional issues, along with the many policy issues
involved in designing a presumptive-guidelines system.

235. See supra notes 125–28 and accompanying text.
236. See supra Section II.C.1.
237. See United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2379–80 (2019). See generally Kate Stith,
Apprendi’s Two Constitutional Rights, 99 N.C. L. REV. 1299 (2021) (discussing Haymond).
238. See supra Section II.C.2.
239. See supra Section II.C.3.
240. See supra Part IV.
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